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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-55 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides a summary of the 
Payloads, as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) 
and Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSME: subsystems performance during the f if ty-f if th flight of the Space Shuttle 
Program and fourteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Columbia (OV-102). In 
addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET (ET-56); three 
SSME1s, which were designated as seriel number 2031, 2109, and 2029 in positions 
1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBfs which were designated BI-057, The 
lightweight RSRMts that were installed in each SRB were designated as 360L030A 
for the left SRB and 360W030B for the right SRB. 
The STS-55 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle 
Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. That 
document states that each major organizational element supporting the Program 
will report the results of their hardware evaluation and mission performance 
plus identify all related in-flight anomalies. 
The primary objective of this flight was to successfully launch, operate, and 
return the German Spacelab D2 payload. The German D2 payload is composed of the 
Spacelab Module, the unique support structure (USS), and the rezction kinetic in 
glass melts (RKGM) get-away special (GAS). The secondary objective of this 
flight was to perform the operations of the 3huttle Amateur Radio Experiment 
( SAREX-11) payload. 
The sequence of events for the STS-55 mission is shown in Table I, the official 
Orbiter and GFE Projects Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 11, and the 
offizial MSFC In-Flight Anomaly List is shown in Table 111. The Mission Control 
Center and Payload anomalies are also referenced where applicable. Appendix A 
lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used in the 
preparation sf this document. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms 
and abbreviations used in this document. All times given in this report are in 
Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as mission elapsed time (MET). 
The STS-55 mission was planned as a 9-day mission with an additional day being 
highly desirable. The capability for this additional day was determined in 
real-time based on consumables with mission planning accommodating the longer 
duration wherever appropriate. Some 90 experiments were planned for completion 
during the mission by the seven-member crew that was divided into two teams, red 
and blue, so that scientific operations were performed around the clock. 
In addition to presenting a summary of subsystem performance, this report also 
discusses the payload operations and results, as well as each in-flight anomaly 
that was assigned to each major element (Orbiter, SSHE, ET, SRB, and RSRM). 
Listed in the discussion of each anomaly in the applicable subsection of the 
report is the officially assigned tracking number as published by each 
respective Project Office in their respective Problem Tracking List. 
The crew for this fifty-fifth flight of the Space Shuttle was Steven R. Nagel, 
Col., USAF, Commander; Terence T. Henricks, rol., USAF, Pilot; Jerry L. Ross, 
Col., USAF, Mission Specialist 1; Charles .I. Precourt, Hajor, USAF, Hission 
Specialist 2; Bernard A. Harris, Jr., H.D., Civilian, Hission Specialist 3; 
Ulrich Walter, Paylgad Specialist 1; and Bans William Schlegel, Payload 
Specialist 2. STS-55 was the fourth space flight for the Commander and Mission 
Specialist 1, the second space flight for the Pilot, and the first space flight 
for Mission Specialist 2, Mission Specialist 3, Payload Specialist 1, and 
Payload Specialist 2. 
MISSION SUHHARY 
After an excellent launch countdown that vas leading to an on-time launch from 
launch complex 39A at 8:51:00 a.m. c.s.t. on Harch 22, 1993, the initial launch 
attempt for the STS-55 mission experienced an on-pad abort about 3 seconds prior 
to the planned lift-off. The Space Shuttle main engine (SSHE) oxidizer 
preburner (OPB) purge pressure exceeded the maximum redline value because one of 
the five check valves in the purge system leaked and the monitor detected 
combustion product pressure which exceeded the 50-psia redline. Also, the 
liquid hydrogen (LH2) 4-inch External Tanklorbiter (ET/Orbiter) disconnect valve 
closed slowly following the on-pad abort on Harch 22, 1993 (Flight Problem 
STS-55-V-01A). After replacement of all three SSHE's and verification of the 
performance of the necessary prelaunch subsystems and payloads systems, 
the launch of STS-55 was rescheduled for April 24, 1993. 
Approximately 9 hours before the planned launch on April 24 (seccnd attempt) 
while changing the mode of inertial measurement unit (IHU) 2 (model KT-70) from 
standby to operate, an IHU 2 platform-fail built-in test equipment (BITE) 
indication was received (Flight Problem STS-55-V-02). Several mode cycles 
between standby and operate were made and the failure was not repeated. As a 
result of the initial failure indication and the uncertainty of the possible 
recurrence of the failure, a decision was made to replace the IHU and reschedule 
the launch for April 26, 1993. 
The STS-55 Space Shuttle Vehicle was launched at 116:14:50:00.017 G.m.t. 
(9:50 a.m. c.d.t.) from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on April 26, 1993. The 
ascent phase was nominal. 
After the successful launch, the LE 4-inch disconnect valve did not close when 
commanded several seconds prior to h separation; however, it did close at 
ET/Orbiter umbilical retraction which is part of the ET separation sequence 
(Flight Problem STS-55-V-01B). 
A determination of vehicle performance was made using vehicle acceleration and 
preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the average 
flight-derived specific impulse (I ) determined for the time period between SKB 
separatio? and start of 3-g throttf!ng was 453.2 seconds as compared to the 
average value of 452.74 seconds. 
A review of the postlaunch lightning data at KSC revealed radio frequency (RF) 
signals that were detected by the Lightning Detection and Ranging (LDAR) system 
during ascent between 48 and 50 seconds mtssion elapsed time (HET). Orbiter 
data showed simultaneous electromagnetic disturbances being registered on UHF 
receiver 4. The LDAR was tuned to 63 HEz and registered 11 pulses, and the UBF 
receiver operated at 243 MHz. These data indicate that the interference vas 
broadband in nature and would imply lightning since it  is characterized by 
broadband pulses in this frequency range. However, a review of the launch films 
revealed no visible discharge. 
The waste water liquid pressure increased by 13 psig to 22 psig during the first 
5 hours of the mission. A concern was expressed with respect to the tank 
bellows being stuck; however, an increase in waste tank quantity had accompanied 
several of the waste liquid pressure increases due to urinelfan separator use. 
Furthermore, past data indicated that the bellows in the OV-102 vehicle waste 
tank exerted more force when compared with other vehicles, thus requiring a 
higher liquid pressure to fill the tank. 
At 117:02:24 G.m.t. (00:11:34 MET), about three hours into a flash evaporator 
system (FES) water dump, the gaseous nitrogen regulator pressure in the common 
manifold for tht supply and waste water tanks dropped to 6 psig. The FES water 
dump was terminated 11 minutes later to prevent any anomalous FES operation. 
Troubleshooting and malfunction-procedure workarounds pinpointed a probable leak 
in the nitrogen system that pressurizes the water tanks. The water alternate 
pressure valve was opened and all water tanks were pressurized with cabin air. 
A FES supply water dump was subsequently completed successfully. 
At approximately 118:02:12 G.m.t. (01:11:22 MET), the crew reported that a 
puncture was found in the wall of the waste water tank (Flight Problem 
STS-55-V-04). Subsequelrt video was downlinked showing the puncture and 
deformation of the waste water tank wall. The crew reported no signs of liquid 
leakage, therefore indicating that the tank bellows was still intact. The 
postflight investigation showed that an existing dent in the tank wall jammed 
one side of the bellows, eventually forcing a rulon tab, which is connected to 
the bellows, to puncture the tank wall. As a result of the gaseous nitrogen 
leak, the contingency water container (CWC) was placed in use for holding the 
waste water. Waste water dumps from the CVC werr successfully performed 
throughout the flight. An in-flight maintenance (IFU) procedure to isolate the 
GN leak from the water tank pressurization system was completed successfully at 
118 : 23: 34 G. m. t . (02: 38: 44 MET), and all supply water tanks were repressurized 
to 16 psig. 
At 117:18:38 G.m.t. (01:03:48 MET), the heater for reaction control subsystem 
(RCS) thruster L4D failed on (Flight Problem STS-55-V-06). The heater was 
controlled manually for the remainder of the flight. The injector upper 
temperature was limited to 160°F (operational) and 185OF (nor.-operational). The 
injector lower temperature was limited to 60°F. The switch controlling the 
thruster L4D heater also controls the heaters on five other thrusters. This 
failure did not impact operations on this flight. 
At 118:15:27 G.m.t. (02:00:37 MET), the FES experienced an over-temperature 
shutdown. The FES was deactivated until normal supply water pressure of 30 psia 
was restored. At 118:23:47 G.m.t. (02:08:57 MET), with GN2 pressure restored, a 
FES water dump was initiated. After 5 minutes of stable operation, the FES 
again experienced an over-temperature shutdown. The crew cycled the FZS and it 
immediately shut down without reaching its control band. All shutdowns occurred 
on the primary A controller. The shutdowns were attributed to ice formation in 
the topping core while operating at low supply-water pressure. The ice was 
successfully removed using a flush procedure about 14 hours after the last PES 
shutdown. The radiators were bypassed to increase the F1:eon inlet tea3erature 
to the FES and then the secondary controller was cycled several times to flush 
the ice from the core. A momentary drop in the right topping duct temperatures 
indicated that some ice passed through the duct. The FES was operated on the 
primary controller B for about an hour before the FES and the duct heaters were 
deactivated to conserve power for the remainder of the mission. The radiators 
were deployed at 119:14:50 G.m.t. (03:00:00 MET) to provide additional heat 
rejection since the FES was no longer being operated. The radiators were stowed 
at 125:OO:lO G.m.t. (08:10:00 MET), and the FES primary B controller was used 
for supplemental cooling. The primary A controller was selected for two water 
dumps, starting at 125:19:30 G.m.t. (09:04:40 HET) and 125:20:53 G.m.t. 
(09:06:03 MET), and the controller operation was nominal, therefore, exonerating 
any controller malfunction as a cause of the earlier shutdowns. 
Following a problem earlier in the mission when a thermal impulse printer system 
(TIPS) message sent via Ku-band was not received onboard, a procedure was 
developed to correct the problem. The encryption bypass isolation assembly 
(EBIA) must be pcwered an for TIPS to operate through the Ku-band. This 
procedure kept the EBIA powered while the Text and Graphics System (TAGS) was 
powered off. The TIPS configuration operated well until late in the mission 
when it was turned off to save paper for future graphics requirements. 
RCS interconnect operations to the right orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) was 
established at 119:23:16 G.m.t. (03:18:26 MET). 
The hydraulic system 3 main pump case drain temperature measurement (V58T0385A) 
exhibited an unusual signature (Flight Problem STS-55-V-07). Because the main 
pump does not operate on-orbit, the temperature in the line should be relatively 
constant. However, this temperature measuremeni responded rapidly to each 
hydraulic system 3 circulation pump run. Hydraulic systems 1 and 2 main pump 
case drain temperature measurements did not respond to circulation pump runs. 
Postflight troubleshooting showed the sensor had been bonded to the hydraulic 
system 3 filter module high pressure outlet line. The sensor will be moved to 
the correct line. 
Consumables savings continued to increase to the level desired so that the 
extension day could be added to the flight. The Mission Management Team (HtlT) 
decided that the mission would be extended by one day. The landing was pla~ned 
for Thursday morning (May 6, 1993) at approximately 8:00 a.m. c.d.t. 
OMS propellant usage by the RCS during interconnect operations was discontinued 
at 122:17:58:50 G.m.t. (06:03:08:50 W T )  with 7.65 percent of OMS propellant 
used from the left OMS and 7.43 percent of the OMS propellants used from the 
right OMS. 
At 123:23:35:39 G.m.t. (07:08:45:39 MET), the crew entered an Item 18 Execute to 
initiate the mass memory unit (HHU) 1 checkpoint. Thirteen seconds later, 
Off/Busy MMU 1 and Checkpoint Fail fault messages were annunciated by general 
wrpose computer (GPC) 4, and GPC 4 logged a single input/outpur (I/O) error 
other indications (Flight Problem STS-55-V-10). The crew cycled the HMU 
power in accordance with normal malfunction procedures and the checkpoint was 
satisfactorily completed on a subsequent attempt. The failure history of MHU 1 
as well as the software interfaces were investigated in an effort to determine 
the cause of this occurrence. MMU 1 was used throughout the rest of the mission 
without a recurrence of this anomaly. 
A fuel cell purge was performed at 120:15:12 G.m.t (04:00:22 MET), 70.5 hours 
after the previous purge. This effectively met the goal of 72 hours between 
purges. Another fuel cell purge was completed at 123:14:58 G.m.t. 
(07:00:08 HET), 72 hours after the previous purge. 
At 124:12:59 G.m.t. (07:22:09 MET), GPC 4 annunciated an input!output error on 
CRT 4 (Flight Problem STS-55-V-11). The crew reported that the CRT 4 display 
electronics unit (DEU) BITE flag was tripped and that CRT 4 was blank. The crew 
performed the malfunction procedure, but the CRT was not recovered. CRT 4 was 
powered down and remained powered down for the rest of the mission. Due to the 
signature, i t  is believed that the problem resides in the DEU. 
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was completed at approximately 
125:10:50 G.m.t. (08:20:00 MET), and the data review indicated that the checkout 
was nominal. APU 1 consumed 15 lb of fuel during the 5 rri~~~tes 9 seconds of 
satisfactory operatior. All hydraulics functions were nominal during the 
checkout, and no water spray cooling was required. 
The RCS hot-fire test was performed at 125:11:06 G.m.t. (08:20:16 Hz?). Data 
review indicated that all thrusters performed as expected. 
Evaluation of the entry heating damage to the elevon cove of the right wing 
following the STS-56 mission, during which the alternate elevon schedule was 
used in support of Development Test Objective (DTO) 251, has shown that the 
heating was outside the thermal design base and previous flight experience. 
This resulted in a concern being raised about performing DTO 251 with the 
alternate elevon schedule during the STS-55 entry. The alternate elevon 
schedule allows up-elevon deflection of lo0 or more if aileron trim is required. 
Analysis during the flight showed that should an early transition occur 
following entry interface as it did on STS-56 (coupled with the fact that this 
Orbiter is approximately 20,000 lb heavier than the STS-56 Orbiter), the damage 
to the elevon core may be greater than that seen on STS-56. As a result, a 
decision was made by the HHT to use the automatic elevon schedule which allows a 
maximum of 7 O  up-elevon. Postflight inspections revealed no damage to the 
elevon cove area. 
Both payload bay doors were closed and latched nominally by 126:09:24:51 G.m.t. 
(09:18:34:51 MET). As a result of unacceptable weather at the Shuttle Launch 
Facility at KSC, ;he landing was delayed for one orbit and the landing site was 
changed to Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). The deorbit maneuver was performed at 
126:13:29:20 G.m.t. (09:22:39:20 FET). The maneuver was approximateiy 
176 seconds in duration and the bV was 290.2 ft/sec. All programmed test inputs 
(PTIfs) were perforned during entry as planned. 
During entry at 126:13:46:14 2.m.t. (09:22:56:14 MET) and 126:13:46:35 G.m.t. 
(09:22:56:35 HET), fault messages were recorded when the lubrication oil outlet 
pressure dropped below 25 psia. After the APU warmed up, the pressure increased 
to a satisfactory level of 30 2 5 psia for the remainder of entry, APU 1 also 
experienced one gearbox repressurization which occurred when the gearbox 
pressure dropped below 5 psia about 4 minutes prior to landing. This APU has 
leaked gaseous ni trogen past the turbine seal 01: previous flights; however, its 
leakage rate was within specification. 
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at Edwards Air Force Base on concrete 
runway 22 at 126:14:29:59 G.m.t. (09:23:39:59 MET) on May 6, 1993. Nose landing 
gear touchdown occurred 17 seconds after main gear touchdown with the Orbiter 
drag chute being deployed satisfactorily at 126:14:30:16 G.m.t. The drag chute 
was jettisoned at 126:14:30:4i G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 
126:14:31:00 G.m.t. Preliminary indications are that the rollout was normal in 
all respects. The flight duration was 9 days 23 hours 39 minutes 59 seconds. 
All three APUts were powered down by 126:14:44:59 G.m.t., and the Orbiter 
weighed approximately 227,279 lb at landing. The crew completed the required 
postflight reconfigurations and departed the Orbiter landing area at 
approximately 126:15:20 G.m.t. 
PAY LOADS 
SPACELAB D2 
Tho Spacelab D2 mission was the second under German mission management and 
responsibility. The first German Spacelab mission (Dl) was conducted during the 
STS-61A mission in November 1985. The Spacelab D2 mission was oriented toward 
the goals of thrj space utilization program of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and also the microgravity program of the European Space Agency (ESA). Besides 
continuing research areas and scientific experiments from Spacelab Dl, the 
Spacelab D2 mission was multi-disciplinary and covered the fields of materials 
and life sciences. Numerous universities, research institutes, and industrial 
concerns in Germany and other countries contributed to the scientific 
experiment program. 
The Spacelab was activated at 116:18:59 G.m.t. (00:04:09 MET) and the payload 
was activated 28 minutes later. Energy conservation measures allowed the 
mission to be extended by one day to collect additional science data. A total 
of 88 experiments in 11 disciplines of science and technology were performed. 
These experiments spanned a wide range of categories including automation and 
robotics, telescience, biotechnology, physiology, fluid physics, material 
solidification and crystallization, Earth observations, and astronomy. The 
payload was deactivated at 126:06:25 G.m.t. and the final Spacelab deactivation 
occurred 3 hours 10 ~inutes later. Preliminary analysis has shown that 
experiments have met or exceeded the mission objectives in almost all cases. 
Material Sciences Experiment Double Rack for Experiment nodules and Apparatus 
Rack 3 was the material sciences experiment double rack for experiment modules 
and apparatus (HEDEA), and contained nine experiments which are as follows: 
a. Floating Zone Growth of Gallium Arsenide Experiment. 
b. Floating Zor 2 Crystal Growth of Gallium-Doped Germanium. 
c. Hysteresis of the Specific Beat CV During Beating and Cooling through 
the Critical Point. 
d. Diffusion of Nickel in Liquid Copper-Aluminum and Copper-Gold Alloys. 
e. Directional Solidification of Germanium-Gallium Arsenide Eutectic 
Com~osites. 
f. Cellular-Dendritic Solidification with Quenching of Aluminium-Lithium 
Alloys. 
g. Directional Solidification of a Copper-Manganese Alloy. 
h. Thermoconvectior. at Dendritic-Eutectic Solidification of a 
Aluminum-Silicon Alloy. 
i. Growth of Gallium-Arsenide from Gallium Solutioils. 
Both the ellipsoid heating facility (ELLI) and the gradient furnace with 
quenching (GFQ) experiments were able to achieve more runs than planned prior to 
the mission. The high precision thermostat (EPT) was able to make measurements 
to substantiate the singularity of thermo-physical properties, specifically the 
critical temperature zone. This substantiation was unclear from the Spacelab 
Dl data. 
Werkstofflabor Material Sciences Laborator2 
The Werkstofflabor (VL) Material Sciences Laboratory was located in rack 8 of 
the Spacelab module. The facility consisted of five furnaces, a fluid physics 
module, and a crystal growth module. The laboratory contained the following 
experiments. 
a. OSIRIS: Oxide Dispersion Strengthened Single Crystalline Alloys 
Improved by Resolidification in Space. 
b. Impurity Transport and Diffusion in INSB Melt ~.,cler Microgravity 
Envi ronmen t . 
c. Cellular-Dendritic Solidifichtion at Lov Rate of Aluminium-Lithium 
Alloys. 
d. Directional Solidification of the Lithium Fluoride - Lithium Barium 
Fluorine - Eutectic. 
e. Separation Behavior of Monotectic Alloys. 
f. Liquid Columns' Resonances. 
g. Stability of Long Liquid Columns. 
h. Higher Modes and their Instabilities of Oscillating Marangoni 
Convection in a Large Cylindrical Liquid Column. 
i. Marangoni-Benard Instability. 
j. Onset of Oscillatory Marangoni Flows. 
k. Marangoni Convection in a Rectangular Cavity. 
1. Stationary Interdiffusion in a Non-Isothermal Molten Salt Mixture. 
m. Transport Kinetics and Structure of Metallic Melts. 
n. Nucleation and Phase Selection During Solidification of Under-cooled 
Alloys. 
o. Heating and Remelting of an Allotropic Iron-Carbon-Silicon Alloy in a 
Ceramic Skin and the Effect of the Volume Change on the Mold's 
Stability. 
p. Immiscible Liquid Metal Systems. 
q. Convective Effects on the Growth of GainsB Crystals. 
r. Vapor Grovth of INP-Crystal with Halogen 1-ansport in a Closed 
Ampoule. 
s. Solution Growth of Gallium Arsenide Crystals Under Microgravity. 
t. Crystallization of Nucleic Acids and Nucleic Acid-Protein Complexes. 
u. Crystallization of Ribosomal Particles. 
The experimenters were very pleased with the results obtained from this very 
complex experiment facility. Experimentation in this facility included 
diffusion coefficient measurements, which describe the internal mobility of 
liquids and are important hsic data in the chemical and metallurgical 
processes. In the Spacelab D-2 mission, approximately 40 experiments were made 
with metallic melts, salt, and glass melts. 
Holographic Optics Laboratory 
The Holographic Optics Laboratory (BOLOP; was located in raci 11 of the Spacelab 
module and contained the following experiments. 
a. Marangoni Convection in a Rectangular Cavit). 
b. Interfe,:netric Determinarion of the Differential Interdiffusion 
Coefficient of Binary Molten Salts. 
c. Idile: Measurements of Diffusion Coefficients in Aqueous Sclution. 
d. Nugro: Phase Separation in Liquid Mixtures with Miscability Gap. 
A preliminary review of the data showed that all objectives were successfully 
accomplished. 
Baroreflex 
The B-iroreflex experiment was located in rack 12, and the experiment was used to 
investigate the theory that lightheadedness and a reduction in blood pressure in 
astronauts upon standing after landing may arise because the normal reflex 
system regulating blood pressures behaves differently after having adapted to a 
microgravity environment. Successful measurements were made on all crew 
members, and the investigating team is pleased with the results. 
Robotics Experiment 
The Robotics Experiment (ROTEX) was a six-joint robotic arm that operated within 
an enclosed workcell in rack 6 of the Spacelab module. The drm used 
teleprogramming and artificial intelligence to evaluate the designs, 
verification acd operation of advanced autonomous systems for future 
application. 
The complete automation systel ,f the ROTEX experiment performed extremely well. 
Several modes were successfully demonstrated including telescience operations 
from the ground and by the crew. The arm performed extremely vell in capturing 
a free-floating object. 
An throrack 
The Anthrorack (AR) was developed by ESA, and is designed to investigate human 
physiology under microgravity conditions. The AR provided a set of common user 
stimulaiion and measurement instruments, supported by centralized services. 
Experiments that were conducted using the AR equipment are as follows: 
a. Cardiovascular Regulation at Kicrogravity. 
b. Central Venous Pressure during Hicrogravity. 
c. Determination of Segmental Fluid Content and Perfusion. 
d. Left Ventricular Function at Rest and Under Stimulation. 
e. Peripheral and Central Hemodynamic Adaptation to Hicrogravity During 
Rest, Exercise, and Lover Body Negative Pressure in Humans. 
f. Tonometry - Intraocular Pressure in Hicrogravity. 
g. The Central Venous Pressure during !!bcrogravity. 
h. Tissue Thickness and Tissue Compliance Along Body Axis Under 
Hicrogravi ty Condi t ions. 
i. Changes in the Rate of Whole-Body Nitrogen Turnover, Protein 
Synthesis and Protein Breakdovn under Conditions of Hicrogravity. 
j. Regulation of Volume Aomeostasis in Reduced Gravity with Possible 
Involvement of Atrial Natriuretic Factor Urodilatin and Cyclic GHP. 
k. Effects of Microgravity on Glucose Tolerance. 
1. Influence of Microgravity on Endocrine and Renal Elements of Volume 
Hosteos tasis . 
m. Effects of Spaceflight on Pituitary-GonaT-Adrenal Function in the 
Human. 
n. Adaptation to Hicrogravity and Readaptation to Terrestrial 
Conditions. 
o. Pulmonary Stratification and Compartment Analysis with Reference to 
Hicrogravity. 
p. Pulaonary Perfusion and Ventilation in Microgravity Rest and 
Exercise. 
q. Ventilation Distribution in Hicrogravity. 
r. Effects of Microgravity on the Dynamics of Gas Exchange, Ventilation 
and Heart Rate in Submaximal Dynamic Exercise. 
s. Cardiovascular Regulation in Hicrogravity. 
The facility collected scientific data on the cardiovascular system, pulmonary 
system, and the fluid-shift phenomena. The data vill aid in the development of 
medical diagnostic techniques. A new type of measurement was successfully made, 
a ballistocardiograph. The investigating team was pleased with the results and 
the amount of data collected was in excess of that planned. 
Biolabor Facility 
The Biolabor facility was developed by Germany (HHB/Erno) for use in the 
Shuttle. The facility is for the conduct of research in electrofusion of cells, 
cell cultivation, botany experiments, and zoological experiments. The facility 
is equipped with a microscope, a cell electrofusion control unit, two cell 
cultivation incubators, a cooler, and two middeck-mounted cooling boxes. The 
following experiments were performed using this facility. 
a. Development of Vestibulocular Reflexes in Amphibia and Fishes with 
Microgravity Experience. 
b. Comparative Investigations of Microgravity Effects on Structural 
Development and Function of the Gravity Perceiving Orga? of Tro 
Water-Living '2ertebrates. 
c. Structure- and Function-Related Neuronal Plasticity of the Central 
Nervous Sys tem of Aquatic Vertebrates During Early Ontogene t ic 
Development under Hicrogrsvity Conditions. 
d. Immunoelectron Hicroscopic Investigation of Cerebellar Development at 
Microgravi ty . 
e. Gravisensitivity of Cress Roots. 
f. Cell Polarity and Gravity. 
g. Influence of Gravity on Fruiting Bcdy Development of Fungi. 
h. Significance of Gravity and Calcium-Ions on the Production of 
Secondary Metabolites in Cell Suspensions. 
i. Influence of Conditions in Low Earth Orbit on Expression and 
Stability of Genetic Information in Bacteria. Productivity of 
Bacteria. Fluctuation Test on Bacterial Cultures. 
j. Connective Tissue Biosynthesis in Space: Gravity Effects of Collagen 
Synthesis aiid Cell Proliferation of Cultured Mesenchymal Cells. 
k. Antigen-Specific Activation of Regulatory T-Lymphocytes of Lymphokine 
Production. Growth of Lymphocytes under Microgravity Conditions. 
1. Enhanced Hybridoma Production under Hicrogravity. 
m. Culture and Electrofusion of Plant Cell Protoplasts under 
Microgravity: Morphological/Biochemical Characterization. 
n. Yeast Experiment HB-L29/Yeast: Investigations on Metabolism. 
The Siolabor facility performed very well, and the scientific resuits were very 
satisfying to the investigating team. 
Cosmic Radiation Experiments 
a. Biological HZE-Particle Dosimetry with Biostack. 
b. Personal Dosimetry: Measurement of the Astronauts Ionizing Radiation 
Exposure. 
c. Measurement of the Radiation Environment Inside Spacelab at Locations 
which differ in Shielding against Cosmic Radiation. 
d. Chromosome Aberration. 
e. Biological Response to Extraterrestrial Solar W Radiation and Space 
Vacuum. 
Unique Support Structure Payloads 
The Unique Support Structure was mounted in the payload bay near the Spacelab 
module, and the structure provided support for additional experiment facilities 
which were connected to the Spacelab for power and data, but ran independently. 
The following experiments were located on this structure. 
a. Material Science Autonomous Payload (HAUS). This payload was 
composed of two experimt.nts; one which explored diffusion phenomena 
of gas bubbles in salt melts (gas bubbles in glass melts and reaction 
kinetics in glasr melts), and the second which performed research on 
complex boiling processes (pool boiling). 
b. Atomic Oxygen Exposure Tray (AOET). This tray was a self-standing 
facility that performed experiments in the field of material science. 
The AOET was a quasi-passive sample array of 124 circular or 
rectangular sample plates mounted in the payload bay such that the 
samples were facing the incoming atmospheric flow. 
c. Galactic Ultrawide-Angle Schmidt System Camera (GAUSS). This 
instrument was an ultraviolet camera which took about 100 wide-angle 
(field of view was 145O) photographs of the galaxy and the Earth's 
atmosphere. The camera's film magazine was reported to be full with 
over 100 pictures of the Hilky Vay and the Earth's atmosphere. 
d. Modular Opto-Electronic Hultispectral Stereo Scanner. This 
instrument, knovn as HOHS, was an advanced camera system of Earth 
observation. The camera provided imaging data from space for 
photogrammetric mapping and thematic mapping applications. The HOHS 
tape recorder was filled to its capacity of nearly 5 hours. Data 
vere obtained over the Philippines, Cambodia, Australia, and Africa. 
The electronic camera system provided three-dimensional topographical 
exposures that are prwiding information on the kind as well as the 
structure of the surfdce. The investigating team believes that 
information on geology, building construction, and vegetation will be 
contained in the data. 
Crew Telesupport Experiment 
This experiment combined an onboard-computer-based, multi-media documentation 
file, which included text, graphics, and photographs, with real-time graphical 
communications between a crew member and the ground station. The experiment 
demonstrated communications with the Hission Control Center and the Orbiter. 
Communications were not totally satisfactory with the German facility as the 
graphics mode could not be successfully demonstrated. 
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment 
The Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment (SAREX) enabled four of the crew members to 
have voice contact with students from around the world. Also, as time 
permitted, amateur radio operators from the general nhamn community vere also 
able to have a contact with the SAREX. Another amateur radio experiment, called 
SAFEX, was located in the Spacelab module and was operated by the German payload 
specialists. The SAFEX used a 2 meter/70 cm antenna mounted on the outside of 
the Spacelab, while the SAREX used a window-mounted antenna in the Orbiter crew 
station. 
The SAREX operations overall vere very successful. All school contacts except 
one acquired good communications with the crew. The remaining school withdrew 
voluntarily being content with having heard the crew. The SAREX/Spacelab 
Amateur Funk Experiment (SAFEX) anrema test was successfully completed. In 
addition, a short voice contact was made with the Hir cosmonauts. 
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Preliminary data indicated that the SAFEX antenna (located outside the module) 
performed significantly better than the SAREX antenna (mounted in the crew 
compartment windows). The SAREX antenna anomaly was suspected to be a cable 
fatigue failure at the connector interface. Subsequent SAREX operations were 
performed using the SAFEX antenna. The SAREX transmitter was used for one of 
the SAFEI: passes after a failure of the SAFEX transmitter. Satisfactory 
operation L I ~  the SAFEX transmitter was regained for use in the final operation. 
VEHICLE PERFORHANCE 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERSIREDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS 
All SRE systems perfozmed as expected. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, 
and no C'KB or redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRW) in-flight anomalies have been 
identified. No SRB or RSRM Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operational 
Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) violations 
01: curred 
.P<bwer 11 and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters was 
ac:ompli.;hed routinely. All RSRH temperatures were maintained within acceptable 
lik-its ttiroughout the couctdown. For this flight, the low-pressure heated 
gromd purge in the SRB af t skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle joint and 
flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges. At T-15 minutes, 
the grou~:d purge was changed to high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt. 
Data indicate that rhe flight performance of both RSRM's was well within the 
a l l ~ w ~ ~ b l e  performance envelopes, and the perforuiance was typical of that 
obser red cin previous flights. The RSRH propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) 
was 6C°F at lift-off. A pressure fluctuation was recorded in the left-hand SRB 
at T .. 71.5 seconds. The thrust vector control and rate gyro assembly data were 
reviel ed for specific responses to the spike. Some activity was noted; however, 
this zctivity appears to be normal jn all aspects. 
Both SRB's .zere SUP essfully separated from the ET at lift-off plus 
125.5 sec,-jrtds, and reports based on visual sightings from the recnery area 
indicated that the decelerations subsystem performed as expected. Main 
parachute 3 on the right SRB sustained heavy ribbon damage in two gores. Gore 
60 sustzined 37 c;nsecutive broken horizontal ribbons (207 through 243, 
including ripstop ribbon 229). In addition, gore 61 sustained 82 consecutive 
broken horizontal ribbons (181 through 262 including three ripstop ribbons 205, 
229, and 246). Ripstop -:ibbons 180 and 263 on either side of the damaged region 
of gore 61 w x e  inta:t and appeared to contain the damage. This damage was the 
result of the main pa~achute canopy 3 rubbing against the aft bipod strut region 
of the main canoL. 3 rubbing against the aft bipod strut of the aft bipod strut 
region c ~ f  the :.~stum. Pink witness paint was found on main parachute 3 canopy 
3 in the darn-.ged region. 
Both SRB's were observed during descent and were recovered and returned to KSC 
for dj -asserrbly and refurbishment. 
F.Sid perforu~ance is J.elineated in  he table on the following page. 
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE 
I 
Parameter 
Impulse ga es 6 1-20. 10, lbf-sec 
1-60; 10; lbf-oec 
I-AT, 10 lbf-sec 
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm 
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60°F 
Bu: :eysf:/oec P 66.F I at 625 psia 
Event times, seconds I Ignition interval 
Web timea 
Separation cue, 50 psia 
' Action time 
PMBT, O F  
Maximum ignition rise rate, 
psia/lO ms 
Decay time, seconds 
(59.4 psia to 85 K), 
klbf -sec 
Left motor, 68OF 
Predicted 1 Actual 
I 
EXTERNAL TANK 
Right motor, 68OF 
Predicted [Actual 
I 
Tailoff imbalance 
Impulse differential, 
ET flight performance was excellent. All objectives and requirements associated 
with the ET propellant loading and flight operations were met. All ET 
electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. ET purge and 
heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No OMRSD or LCC 
violations were identified. No ET in-flight anomalies were identified. 
Typical ice/frost formations for the April atmospheric environment were observed 
on the ET during the countdown. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present 
on the LO2 and LH2 feedlines and on the pressurization line brackets, and some 
lotes~ 
All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by 
the letter a. These items are referenced t3 lift-off time (Ignition 
interval). 
Tailof f imbalance is equal to left motor minus right motor, and was 
calculated by Marshall Space Flight Center. 
Predicted 
N/A 
Act us& 
324.6 
frost or ice was present along the LA2 protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. These 
observations were acceptable based on criteria given in NSTS-08303. There was 
no observed ice or frost on the acreage of the LO2 and LH2 tank barrel. 
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and 
flight. The minimum LO ullage pressure experienced during the period of the 2 
ullage pressure slump was a no~inal 14.1 psid. 
ET separation was confirmed, and mhin engine cutoff (UECO) occurred within 
expected tolerances. ET entry and breakup was nominal and the impact point was 
approximately 83 nni. uprange of the preflight predicted point. 
Photographs taken after ET separation revealed approximately six divots in the 
intertank to LEi2 tank flange closeout, numerous small "popcorn" type divots in 
the intertank acreage area, three areas of missing foam 6 to 8 inches long from 
the stringer tops, four divots from the forward area of the LH2 tank insulation 
below the intertank splice closeout, and the +Y jack-pad closeout was missing. 
None of these items were a cause for an in-flight anomaly because they were 
typical of previously observed items and anomaly investigations. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 
The initial launch attempt for the STS-55 mission experienced an on-pad abort 
about 3 seconds prior to the planned lift-off. The Space Shuttle main engine 
(SSUE) oxidizer preburner (OPB) purge pressure exceeded the maximum redline 
value because one of the five check valves in the purge system leaked and the 
monitor detected combustion product pressure which exceeded the 50-psia redline 
(Flight Problea STS-55-E-01). After replacement of all three SS14Ets and the 
performance of the necessary prelaunch systems and payloads verification, the 
launch of STS-55 was rescheduled for April 24, 1993. An investigation team was 
formed and the team determined that the failure was due to a small piece of 
NITRIL Buna-N O-ring material being caught in the sealing surface of the check 
valve. The O-ring material was built into the valve during manufacture. 
Interim action was taken to clear all subsequent flights by running purge cycles 
followed by reverse leak checks on all check valves prior to the next flight. 
For the successful launch, all SSUE parameters were normal throughout the 
prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on 
previous flights. Engine "READYt was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were 
met, and engine start and thrust buildup were normal. 
Flight data indicate that SSUE performance during mainstage, throttling, 
shutdown and propellant dump operations was normal. High pressure oxidizer 
turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were 
well within specification throughout engine operation. No failures were noted, 
nor were any SSUE significant problems identified. UECO occurred 510.24 seconds 
af ter lift-off. 
During ascent, SSHE 3 HPFTP experienced coolant liner pressure fluctuations with 
up to 110-psi shifts (Flight Problem STS-55-E-02). Shifts of chis magnitude 
have been observed in the development program, but are outside of the 
return-to-flight data base. The pressure shifts also violated the 
specifications of 300-psid maximum, as determined by the coolant liner pressure 
minus the main combustion chamber hot gas injection pressure plus 100 psid. 
This problem is not considered a constraint to flight since all other flight 
HPFTPts meet the requirements of the specification and do not exhibit the 
f ' .lctuations observed during flight. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing vas completed as 
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S6A) devices were 
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS 
measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the 
countdown and flight. 
As planned, the SRB S6A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was turned 
off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET separation 
from the Orbiter. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEHS 
Main Propuision System 
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) vas as expected vith 
no anomalies identified. The LO2 and LH2 loading was performed as planned with 
no stop flows or reverts. Also, there were no OHRSD or LCC violations. 
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas 
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the 
Orbiter aft comlartment (occurred shortly after the start of LE2 circulation 
pumps) was approximately 90 ppm, which is the lowest maximum reading for this 
Orbiter vehicle. 
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versuz 
the inventory loads resulted in a loading accuracy of +0.006 ?ercent for the LE2 
and 0.020 percent for LO2. 
Ascent HPS performance was completely normal. Data indicate that the LO2 and 
LH2 pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all net positive 
suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The GO2 
fixed orifice pressurization system performed as predicted, and the GH 
pressurization system performed nominally. Evaluation of the flow control valve 
data also revealed nominal operation. 
During ascent, the HPS pneumatic helium pressure decayed 80 psi from 4240 psia 
t t  lift-off to 4160 psia at WECO, (Plight Problem STS-55-V-12), which is one 
data bit (20 psi) below the OHRSD File 9 requirement of +20/-60 psi. Analysis 
showc:: that when combined vith the temperature change during the T-0 to MECO 
time frame, a leak of approximately 3,000 scim was present. Postflight, when 
the system vas pressurized, a blowing leak was noted at the actuation port of 
the 4-inch disconnect opening solenoid, and the leak was equivalent to 
approximately 3,000 scimts. The leak was determined to be caused by an 
Undr :torqued B-nut at the actuation port. The anomaly had no impact on the 
mission. 
The liquid hydrogen (LH2) 4-inch External Tank/Orbi ter (ET/Orbi ter) disconnect 
valve closed slowly when commanded following the on-pad abort on March 22, 1993 
(Flight Problem STS-55-V-OlA). The close command was sent and the open 
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indicator was lost, but the closed indicator was not received until nearly 
11 minutes later when the LH2 topping valve was opened. Troubleshooting 
included ambient cycling, pressure decays, boroscope inspections, external 
inspections, and replacement of the actuator. None of these efforts could 
explain the problem. 
After the successful launch, the LH2 4-inch ETIOrbiter disconnect valve did not 
close within the specification requirement of 2.8 seconds after MECO. However, 
the disconnect valve did close at ET/Orbiter umbilical retraction 10.4 seconds 
after MECO (Flight Problem STS-55-V-01B). Umbilical camera footage at ET 
separation showed no anomalous venting that would be indicative of either the ET 
or Orbiter disconnect being stuck open. The crew reported what appeared to be 
an abnormal amount of venting from the aft left side of the vehicle. However, 
data do not indicate any source of unusual venting. Video of the umbilical 
after landing revealed that the actuator push-rod was extended out in the fully 
open position. It should have been retracted up into the vehicle after the 
close command was issued. Tests were being conducted as this was written to 
determine the canse of the disconnect-valve closure anomalies. 
During the first launch attempt, the SSME ? helium bottle pressure reached 
4,510 psia, and the LCC limit is 4,500 psia. The pressure remained constant for 
over one hour with bottle temperatures falling. The cause of the problem was a 
50 psia bias in the SSME 2 pressure transducer and a 30 psia bias between the 
facility regulator set point and the actual deiivered pressure. The ground 
source was switched from secondary to primary, and all Orbiter bottle pressures 
then dropped approximately 30 psia. As a result, the SSME 2 pressure was 
reduced to 4480 psia, the LCC violation vas cl=:-ed, and no waiver w a ~  required. 
Reaction Control Zubsystem 
-. * 
The performance of the RCS was nominal throughout the flight. In addition to 
the 4,861.7 lbm of RCS propellants consumed during the mission, 7.65 percent of 
the left OMS propellants and 7.43 percent of the right OMS propellants were 
consumed during RCS/OMS interconnect operations. 
The RCS hot-fire test was performed at 125:11:06 G.m.t. (08:20:16 MET). Data 
review indicated that all thrusters performed as expected. The RCS was used 
during entry to complete six programmed test inputs in addition to the normal 
attitude-control functions. 
At 117:18:38 G.m.t. (01:03:48 MET), the heater for RCS thruster L4D failed on 
(Flight Problem STS-55-V-06). The heater was controlled manually from the 
flight deck for the remainder of the flight. The switch controlling the 
thruster L4D heater also controlled the heaters on five other thrusters. The 
oxidizer and fuel injector tube uppsr temperatures were limited to 160°F 
(operational) and 185OF (non-operational), and injector tube lower temperature 
was limited to 60°F. This failure did not impact operations on this flight. 
The upper temperature limits were consistent with the procedures used for STS-49 
and STS-50 thruster heater failures. The upper limit was set to protect the 
Teflon seats of the valve from cold flowing due to valve closing forces. The 
lower limit protects from valve leakage due to Teflon shrinkage at cold 
temperatures. 
During the course of the mission, three vernier thruster L5D firings had erratic 
chamber pressure. The chamber pressure data were indicative of gas bubbles 
passing through the thruster. At the time of these occurrences, the RCS was 
interconnected to the right OMS. The most likely cause was a small isolated 
pocket of gas trapped in the crossfeed line during 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The OMS performed satisfactorily throughout the flight. Two maneuvers were 
performed for a total firing time of 313.7 seconds on each OMS engine. 
Propellant usage totaled 14,059 lb for the OHS with 8769 lbm of oxidizer and 
5290 lbm of fuel used. 
Ignition for the OMS-2 maneuver occurred at 116:15:29:54.96 G.m.t. 
(00:00:39:54.96 MET). The maneuver was 140.4 seconds in duration and the 
differential velocity (AV) was 222.2 ftlsec. The orbit achieved as a result was 
162.9 by 160.2 nmi. 
The deorbit maneuver was perzormed at 126:13:29:20 G.m.t. (09:22:39:20 MET). 
The maneuver was approximately 173 seconds in duration and the AV was 
290.2 f t/sec. 
During the deorbit maneuver, both the right OMS oxidizer and fuel tank pressures 
decreased about 5 psi over a 73-second period to 245.5 psia for :he oxidizer and 
243.0 psia for the fuel. The specification for these pressures is 
252 psia +5/-7 psia. Following the maneuver, the oxidizer and fuel tank ullage 
pressures returned to normal lock-up pressures. This condition was not seen on 
+' STS-52 when the pressures did not recover to narmal lock-up values following the 
maneuver. A decay was noted du.ring the STS-50 deorbit maneuver; however, the 
lowest value observed was within specification limits. On STS-55, the right OMS 
helium tank pressure rate of decay decreased when the propellant tank pressures 
decreased, indicating that the flow demand had decreased. This condition is 
indicative of a helium flow problem to the propellant tanks. Postflight testing 
was performed to isolate the problem area as this report was written. 
The right orbital maneuvering engine (OME) low-pressure system was leaking at a 
rate of approximately 37 scch. The pressure decreased to 300 psia before 
repressurization was initiated, and the repressurization appeared to fix the 
leak. A similar signature was seen on STS-52 (Flight Problem STS-52-V-07); 
however, on STS-52 the leai continued throughout the flight and several 
repressurizations were performed. Troubleshooting at that time failed to 
isolate the cause of the anomaly and the decision was made to fly as-is. A 
review of data throughout the mission indicates that a small (less than 10 scch) 
leak may still be present. 
The oxidizer gauging system performance was nominal; however, both fuel probes 
exhibited anomalous behavior similar to that noted on STS-50 and STS-52. The 
cause of the anomalous behavior of the gaging system is still being 
investigated; however, the probes will not be replaced until the next Orbiter 
Maintenance Down Period (OHDP) for this vehicle. 
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem 
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally 
throughout the flight. The five-tank-set configuration supplied 2950.5 1b of 
oxygen to the fuel cells, 129.8 lb to the environmental control and life support 
system (ECLSS), and 371.6 lb or hydrogen for the fuel cells. Cryogenics 
remaining at landing were adequate for an additional 39 hours of flight at the 
average power level of 17.9 kW. 
The depletion of the PRSD tank sets 4 and 5 was completed. The quantities in 
hydrogen tanks 4 and 5 reached 1,l percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. The 
hydrogen consumables redline for tank depletion is 2.5 percent. The tank 
depletion was discontinued well within the tank hardware temperature limits 
(-12G°F actual vs. 160°F fluid limit; 67OF actual vs. 200°F limit for the 
heater). Depletion of oxygen tanks 4 and 5 was discontinued when a heater 
temperature reached 250°F (tank heater limit is 350°F). The oxygen fluid 
temperature reached 100°F vs. the 160°F limit. Quantities remaining in oxygen 
tanks 4 and 5 settled at 6.8 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively, with an 
oxygen consumables redline for tank depletion of 6.5 percent. The cryogenics 
consumables margin was improved by depleting tank sets 4 and 5 since actual 
residual quantities were lower than predicted. 
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsys tem 
The fuel cells performed nominally in meeting all electrical requirements of the 
flight. The fuel cells provided 4296 kwh of electrical energy during the flight 
at an average power level of 17.9 kW and electrical load average of 584 amperes. 
The total oxygen consumed in the generation of the electricity was 2950.5 lb, 
total hydrogen consumption was 371.6 lb, and 3,322.1 lb of water were produced. 
Four purges of the fuel cells were performed during the mission. STS-55 was the 
first mission that performance decay was slow enough to reach the desired goal 
of 72 hours between purges. The reactant purity analysis revealed that the 
cryogenics loaded into the tanks was extremely clean, which is the major 
contributing factor to the 72-hour fuel cell purge interval achieved on this 
mission. 
At 117:06:52 G.m.t. (00:16:02 MET), the fuel cell 2 oxygen-flow meter failed 
off-scale low (Flight Problem STS-55-V-05). This was the first off-scale-low 
failure of the -01 configuration sensors. Fuel cell flow meter failures have no 
mission impact as other indications of fuel cell react=t flow rates are 
available. 
The fuel cell 2 alternate water line temperature vent up to 130°F, which was 
above the operating range of the heater. The cause of this condition was warm 
fuel cell water leaking at specification levels past the alternate water line 
check valve. This condition did not affect the flight in any manner. 
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem 
The APU subsystem performed nominally throughout the flight with no in-flight 
anomalies noted. However, three minor problems occurred and are discussed in 
the following paragraphs. The table on the following page shows the APU run 
times and fuel consumption by APU serial number and position. 
Notes: 
a The APUts ran for 15 minutes 4 seconds after landing (touchdown). 
The APU 1 seal cavity drain system pressura decayed from about 16 psia to 
2.5 psia over a six-day period and remained at 2.5 psia ior the remainder of the 
mission. Relief valve leakage is believed to be the cause, and this leakaze has 
been seen cn previous missions. All relief valves were checked during 
postflight activities to verify normal OMRSD operations. 
Flight Phase 
--- 
On-pad abort 
Ascen c 
FCS checkout 
Entry a 
- 
TO tala 
Early activation (5 to 10 minutes) of the tank/fuel line/water system heaters on 
APU 2 was required after ascent to avoid violating the lower fault detection 
annunciation (FDA) limit of 48OF. Systems 1 and 3 reached 49OF and nominal 
heater performance was observzd. An evaluation is now underway to determine if 
the lower FDA can be lowered to avoid future occurrences. 
APU 1 had one gearbiix repressurization during entry about four minutes prior to 
landing. Additionally, the lubrication oil outlet pressure violated the lower 
FDA limit of 25 psia twice after APU start for entry [126:13:46:14 G.m.t. 
(09:22:56:14 MET) and 126:13:46:35 (09:22:56:35 MET)], and once later during 
entry. The pressure then increased to approximately 30 2 5 psia for the 
remainder of the mission, and all lubrication oil system temperatures vere 
nominal throughout entry. The APU is known to leak GN2 past the turbine carbon 
seal, but it does not leak beyond the specification limit. This APU will be 
flown one more mission before being removed because of gas generator valve 
module (GGVM) life limits. 
APU 2 (S/N 403) APU 1 (SIN 407) 
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem 
Time, 
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5:45 
21:ll 
----- 
80: 39 
107 : 35 
APU 3 (S/N 402) 
Time, 
min:sec 
5:45 
21:11 
5:09 
59:OO 
91 : 05 
Overall hydraulics/water spray boiler (WSB) subsystem performance was nominal 
except for the unexpected response of hydraulics system 3 main pump drain 
temperature to circulation pump operations, a momentary freeze-up and subsequent 
over-cool by APU 1 lubrication oil during ascent, and an over-cool of VSB 3 
during entry. Hydraulics and WSB performance during the on-pad abort and the 
launch scrub was nominal. 
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48 
15 
102 
181 
WSB 2 operdtions during the first launch attempt in March revealed a small 
internal leak in the GV2 regulator. The allowable internal leakage through a 
WSB regulator is 0.5 sccm (approximately 0.05 psi/day with 2420-psi inlet 
Fuel 
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pressure and 118 lb of water). Calculation of the internal leakage seen during 
this launch attempt showed approximately 23 sccm (1.1 psi/hr). The internal 
leak repeated again on the second launch attempt, and it was calculated to be 
3.793 psi/hr; however, the leak was not present during the final launch 
countdown. As a result of these problems, the regulator will be replaced during 
the turnaround process. 
The freeze-up of WSB 3 during ascent resulted in the lubrication oil return 
temperature reaching 277OF before the core temperature indicated spraying. The 
flight specification upper limit is 275OF. The elevated temperatures induced 
high-rate spraying that in turn caused an over-cooling condition where the 
temperature reached 22g°F. Following this, the temperature stabilized at 252OF, 
as required. The freeze-up lasted approximately 60 seconds, and the conditi'aa 
did not affect flight operations. 
The prolonged bottom-to-Sun attitude resulted in numerous circulation pump 
cycles because of low fluid tempera'ures in the rudder/speedbrake return lines.. 
To conserve power, the rudderlspeedbrake return line temperature set points for 
the circulation pump control were lowered by 5OF. 
The hydraulic system 3 main pump drain temperature exhi5ited an unusual 
s!.gnatl.~re. The temperature was responding rapidly to each circulation pun- 
run during on-orbit operations. Because the main pump does not operate 
on-orbit, the temperature in the line should be relatively constant. A similar 
signature was observed in the STS-50 data. Hydraulic systems 1 and 2 main pump 
case drain temperature measurements did not respond to circulation pump 
operations. The system 3 drain temperature was also over 20°F cooler during 
entry. It was determined from postflight inspections that the sensor had been 
bonded to the hydraulic system 3 filter module high pressure outlet line, which 
was the wrong line. The sensor was moved to the correct location. 
Review of the on-orbit hydraulic system pump 1 operations indicated that pump 1 
on-times were considerably greater than either pump 2 or pump 3 for the same 
temperature differential increase. Data review and analysis showed that unlike 
systems 2 and 3, system 1 hydraulic fluid was flowing through the 
rudder/speedbrake power drive unit (PDU), and this acc~unted for the longer 
circulation pump operations. 
During entry, WSB 3 had an out-of-specification over-cooling condition with the 
temperature going from 252OF to 226OF. The specification allows only a 15OF 
drop from steady-state for over-cooling to take place. Violation of this 
requirement normally requires a lubrication oil hot flush; however, since this 
was an Improved APU (fAPU) and since IAPUts are not contamination generators, 
the hot-flush was waived. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control 
- -
The electrical power distribution and c,ontrol (EPDC) subsystem performed 
nominally throughout the mission. 
At approximately 116:16:48:32 G.m.t. (00:01:58:32 MET), the -Y and -Z star 
tracker doors were opened. Concurrently and as expected, the forward motor 
control assembly (FHCA) 2 operational status (OP STAT) measurement (V76X2122E) 
went from 1 to 0 showing relay operation. Both doors opened with dual motor 
drive time and automatic inhibit of the ac relays from the limit switches 
occurred. At the completion of t!.at sequence, the measurement should have 
ieturned to 1; hovever, it did not (Flight Problem STS-55-V-03). The 
measurement indicated 0 for the remainder of the flight. This measurement 
reflects the status of leftjright (L/R) vent door 1 and 2, L/R z :t data probe 
motor 2, -Y star tracker motor 2 close, and -Z star tracker motor 2 open relays. 
A data review indicated that the -2 star tracker motor 2 open relay caused the 
OP STAT 2 indication to remain at 0. The star tracker doors were fully open 
allowing normal operations. This problem represented no mission impact. 
During postflight operations at Drydtn Flight Research Facility (DFRF) in 
preparation for ferrying back to KSC, the star tracker doors were cycled apen. 
Data indicated that the doors opened, but that the operational status indication 
still did not revert back to its 1 state. The test verified a problem exi.ted 
in the K16 relay. Further troubleshooting performed at KSS identified the 
anomaly as the K16 relay failed in the closed position. 
Environmental Control and Life S u ~ ~ o r t  Svstem 
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) performed nominally 
throughout the mission. Two anomalies were noted q'lring the missior. and these 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The atmospheric revftalization subsystem (ARS) performed satisfactorily. T'.? 
air and water coolant loops performance was normal. The C02 partial pressure 
was maintained below 6.0 mdig. The cabin air tezperature and relative humidity 
f peaked at 80.S°F and 45.6 percent, rsspectively. The avionics bays 1, 2, a1.d 3 
air outlet temperatures peaked at nominal levels of 103.3OF, 104.5OF, and 
89.5OF, respectively. The avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 water coldplate 
temperatures peaked at n~minal levels of 89.5OF, 92.0°F, and 82.0°P, 
respectively. 
The regenerable carbon dioxide removal system (RCRS) performed in an excellent 
manner with no problems identified. 
The cabin pressure control systems were both used to maintain cabin total 
pressure and oxygen partial pressure nominally following the depletion of the 
Spacelab nitrogen. 
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performance was nominal except for the 
shutdown of the FES. 
At 118:15:27 G.m.t. (02:00:37 MET), :he FES experienced an over-temperature 
shu:down. The FES was deactivated until normal supply water pressure of 30 psia 
was restored. At 118:23:47 G.m.t. (02:08:57 MET), with GN2 pressure restored, a 
FES wacer dump was initiated. After 5 minutes of stable operation, the FES 
azain experienced an over-temperature shutdown. The crew cycled the FES and it 
immediately shut down vithout reaching its control band. All shutdovns occurred 
on the primary A controller. The shutdowns were attributed to ice formation in 
the topping core while operating at low supply-water pressure. The ice was 
successfully removed using a flush procedure about 14 hours after the last FES 
shutdown. The radiators were bypassed to increase the Freon inlet temperature 
to the FES and then the secondary controller was cycled several times to f3ush 
the ice from the core. A momentary drop in the right topping duct temperatures 
indicated that some ice passed through the duct. The FES was operated on the 
primary controller B for about ax! hour before the FES and the duct heaters were 
deactivated to conserve power for the remainder of the mission. The radiators 
were deployed at 119:14:50 G.m.t. (03:OO:OO MET) to provide additional heat 
rejection since the FES was no longer being operated. The radiators were stowed 
at 125:OO:lO G.m.t. (08:lO:OO MET), and the FES primary B controller was used 
for supplemental cooling. The primary A controller was selected for two water 
dumps, starting at 125:19:30 G.m.t. (09:04:40 MET) and 125:20:53 G.m.t. 
(09:06:03 HET), and the controller operation was nominal, therefore, exonerating 
any controller malfunction as a cause of the earlier shutdowns. 
The FES duct and nozzle heaters vere activated on system B in preparation for 
FES activation and radiator stowage. The FES was activated in primary B 
controller at 125:00:20 G.m.t. (08:09:50 HET) and demonstrated proper operation. 
The radiators were stowed shortly thereafter. The primary A controller was 
selected at 126:02:28 G.m.t. (09:11:38 HET) for a FES water dump that lasted 
approximately 67 minutes. Controller operation was nominal throughout this 
period. 
The radiator cold so€. provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus 
13 minutes when the ammonia boiler system (ABS) primary A control was selected. 
Evaporator outlet temperatures were m-intained to a nomical 36OF. This was the 
first use of the system A ammonia boiler since its installation during the 
OMDP. The ABS had an under-temperature condition durislg KSC checkout; however, 
special procedures were developed for this vehicle, and these allowed the ABS to 
control temperatures nominally. 
The supply water and waste management systems performed adequately throughout 
the mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and overboard 
dump system. Twelve supply water dumps were performed at a rate of 
1.47 percent/minute (2.42 lb/min). The supply water dump line temperature was 
maintained between 76OF and 107OF with the use of the line heater. 
The waste-water liquid pressure increased by 13 psig to 22 psig during the first 
5 hours of tt,, mission. A ccncern was expressed with respect to the tank 
bellows being stuck; however, an increase in waste-tank quantity had accompanied 
several of the waste liquid-pressure increases due to urine/fan separator use. 
Furthermore, past data indicated that the bellows in the OV-102 vehicle waste 
tank exerted more force when compared with other vehicles, thus requiring a 
higher liquid pressure to fill the tank. At the time of this occurrence, no 
limits vere being violated with the differential pressure within the 10-psid 
life cycle pressure limit across the bellows. 
At 117:02:24 G.m.t. (00:11:34 MET), about three hours into a FES water dump, the 
gaseous nitrogen regulator pressure in the common manifold for the supply and 
waste water tanks dropped to 6 psig. The FES water dump was terminated 11 
minutes later to prevent any anomalous PES operation. Troubleshooting and 
malfunction-procedure workarounds pinpointed a probable leak in the nitrogen 
svstem that pressurizes the water tanks. The water alternate pressure valve was 
~pened and all ..stet. tanks were pressurized with cabin air. A FES supply water 
dump was subsequcn t ly completed successfully . 
At approximately 118:02:12 G.m.t. (01:11:22 HET), the crew reported that a 
puncture was found in the wall af the waste water tank (Flight Problem 
STS-55-V-04). Subsequent video was downlinked showing the puncture and 
deformation of the vaste water tank wall. The crew reported no signs of liquid 
leakage, thus indicating that the tank bellows was still intact. As a result of 
the gaseoas nitrogen leak, the CVC was placed in use for holding the waste 
water. Four waste water dumps from the CVC were successfully performed 
throughout the flight. An IFM procedure to isolate the GN leak from the water 
tank pressurization system was completed successfully at 118: 23: 34 G.m. t . 
(02:08:44 HET), and all supply water tanks were repressurized to 16 psig. The 
postfl-ight investigation showed that an existing dent in the tank wall jammed 
one side of the bellows, eventually forcing a rulon tab on the bellows through 
7 the tank wall. 
The crew noted that odors were teing given off by the CWC, but no leakage was 
evident. Following a successful waste water dump, the crev was instructed to 
I place the CWC in the Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) wet trash volume. The crew 
i configured the EDO wet trash volume and connected the vent to provide continuous 
compartment venting. 
The waste collection system (VCS) performed satisfactorily throughout the 
mission. No anomalies or problems with the VCS were identified. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
All smoke detection system parameters remained within nominal ranges throughout 
the mission. The use of the fire suppression system was not required. 
t 
Airlock Support System 
The airlock support system was not used to support an extravehicular activity 
(EVA) during this flight. A11 airlock system parameters remained within normal 
ranges throughout the flight. The tunnel adapter EVA hatch thermal cover came 
loose apparently during ascent (Flight Problem STS-55-V-09). The Thermal 
Control Section of the report contains a discussion of this anomaly. 
Avionics and Software Support Subsystems 
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem performance was 
nominal throughout the flight. None of the identified problems impacted the 
flight. 
I 
i 
The IHUts performed satisfactorily. However, approximately 9 hours before the 
planned launch on April 24 (second attempt) while changing the mode of the 
IMU 2 (model KT-70) from standby to operate, an IHU 2 platform-fail built-in 
test equipment (BITE) indication was received (Flight Problem STS-55-V-02). 
Several mode cycles between standby and operate were made and she failure was 
not repeated. As a result of the initial failure indication and the uncertainty 
of the possible recurrence of the failure, a decision was made to replace the 
IUU and reschedule the launch. 
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Prior to the transition to operational sequence (OPS) 2, a roll-rate build-up 
was noted. Data analysis showed the negative roll direction rate build-up was 
caused by thrust £roc1 operating the FES hi-load evaporator while in free drift. 
The direction and roll rate attained are consistent with the calculated roll 
rate based on venting. Although unusual during this time period, the vehicle 
was in free drift attitude ta satisfy a payload requirement. 
The data processing system hardware and flight software performed adequately. 
At 123:23:35:39 G.m.t. (07:08:45:39 MET), the crew entered an Item 18 Execute to 
initiate the HMU 1 checkpoint. Thirteen seconds later, Off/Busy HHU 1 and 
Checkpoint Fail fault messages were annunciated by GPC 4, and GPC 4 logged a 
single I/O error plus other indications (Flight Problem STS-55-V-10). The crew 
cycled the HUU power in accordance with normal malfunction procedures and the 
checkpoint was satisfactorily completed on a subsequent attempt. The failure 
history of MMU 1 as well as the software interfaces were investigated in an 
effort to determine the cause of this occurrence. HHU 1 vas used throughout the 
rest of the mission without a recurrence of this anomaly. 
At 124:12:59 G.m.t. (07:22:09 MET), GPC 4 annunciated an input/output error on 
CRT 4 (Flight Problem STS-55-V-11). The crew reported that the CRT 4 display 
electronics unit (DEU) BITE flag was tripped and that CRT 4 was blank. Due to 
power conservation requirements, CRT 4 had been taken to "standbyn a number of 
times prior to the annunciation. In addition, the CRT also had been displaying 
extended lines on the antenna display prior to the annunciation. Tbe crew 
performed a malfunction procedure, but the CRT was not recovered. CRT 4 was 
powered down and remained powered down for the rest of the missicn. Due to the 
signature, it is believed that the problem resides in the DEU. 
The FCS performed nominally. The FCS checkout uas completed at approximately 
125:10:50 G.m.t. (08:20:00 UET), and the data review indicated that the checkout 
was nominal. 
The displays and controls subsystem performed satisfactorily. Likewise, the 
operational instrumentation (01) and the modular auxiliary data system ( W S )  
performed in a nomfnal manner. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystem 
The performance of the communications and tracking subsystem was nominal. At 
117:00:12 G.m.t. (00:10:22 MET), an anomaly with closed circuit television 
(CCTV) camera A was noted. The downlink video was severely degraded and had 
horizontal multicolored lines running through the picture, coupled with cyclic 
blooming. These conditions are indicative of a power stipply failure. The 
camera was ;.owered down and not used for the rest of the mission. The camera 
was removed and troubleshooting will be performed at Johnson Space Center (JSC). 
First noted at 117:19:00 G.m.t. (01:05:10 UET), camera D had slightly degraded 
video. The camera exhibited a slight jitter in i:s video image throughout the 
mission. The camera was removed and troubleshooting will be performed at JSC. 
At 121:C3:49 G.m.t. (04:12:59 MET), Hission Specialist 2 repcrted a headset 
problem. Transmissions were intermittent on wireless crew communications system 
(WCCS) crew remote unit (CRU) serial number 1037 (Flight Problem STS-55-V-13). 
The batteries vere changed, but this did not resolve the problem. Both the PTT 
ICON and PTT XMIT buttons vere used, and transmissions were intermittent using 
both buttons. When pressure was applied to the PTT ICOH and PTT XMIT buttons, 
the CRU appeared to work properly. The faulty unit has been returned to JSC for 
troubleshooting. 
At 123:20:11 G.m.t. (07:05:21 HET), the crew reported that the VCCS B aud.0 
interface unit (AIU) had failed in the RF transmit mode, but was still optrating 
in the hard-line (EL) mode (Flight Problem STS-55-V-14). The crew also 
indicated that the aud-'? terminal unit (ATU) to which the B unit was connected 
was operating correctly. The cause of this failure is unknown. The AIU was 
returned to JSC for troubleshooting. 
At 124:04:24 G.m.t. (07:13:34 HET) while configured for tvo-way Ku-band 
communications during a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TD9S) handover, the 
Ku-band fail-safe circuit vas disabled via a stored program command (SPC). A 
second command that was intended to reenable the fail-safe circuit was incorrect 
and inadvertently turned the Ku-band to "standby". As a result, communications 
with the Orbiter vere lost for about 80 minutes. Comunications vere regained 
after the crew reactivated the Ku-band system. 
The TIPS began operating satisfactorily. Following a problem earlier in the 
mission when a TIPS message sent via Ku-band was not received onboard, a 
procedure was developed to correct the problem. The EBIA must be powered on for 
TIPS to operate in the Ku-band mode. The EBIA and the TAGS operate from the 
sac remote power controller (RPC); when the TAGS is powered off by ground 
command, the EBIA is also powered off. A procedure was developed to keep the 
EBIA an while TAGS is powered off to enable TIPS to receive messages via 
Ku-band. This TIPS configuration operated well until late in the mission 
when it W ~ S  turned off to save paper for possible future graphics requirements. 
A review of the postlaunch lightning data at KSC revealed a RF signal that was 
detected by the LDAR system during ascent between 47 rsnd 50 seconds WT. 
Orbiter data showed simultaneous electromagnetic disturbance being registered on 
UHF receiver 4. The LDAR was tuned to 63 HEz and the UHF receiver operated at 
243 HHz, indicating that the interference was broadband in nature. 
Structures and Hechanical Subsystems 
All mechanically actuated subsystems performed nominally. The drag chute vas 
flown for the eighth time during the Space Shuttle Program. The drag chute was 
deployed as planned before nose gear touchdown and was jettisoned 25.69 seconds 
later. The drag chute trailed straight behind the vehicle i? .he reefed 
configuration, but trailed off to one side afrer disreef. All drag chute 
operations were nominal. The crew re?orted nu steerin, corrections were 
required because of the aiag chute. 
Evaluation of the entry heating damage to the elevon cove of the right wing 
followj.ng the STS-56 mission, during which the alternate elevcn schedule was 
used in support of Development Test Objective (DTO) 251, has shown that the 
heating was outside the thermal design base and previous flight experience, 
This resulted in a concern being raised about performing DTO 251 with the 
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alternate elevon schedule during the STS-55 entry. The alternate elevon 
schcdule allowed up-elevon deflection of lo0 and more if aileron trim is 
required. The evaluation showed that if an earl) transition occurred following 
entry ir~terface as it did on STS-56 (coupled with the fact that this Orbiter is 
approximately 20,000 lb heavier than the STS-56 Orbiter), the damage to the 
elevon cove may have been greater than that seen on STS-56. As a result, a 
decision was made by the HHT to use the automatic elevon schedule which required 
a maximum of 7O up elevon. No elevon cove damage was found during postflight 
inspections. 
The landing and braking data are presented in the following table. 
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS 
Braking initiation speed 94.6 knots (keas) 
Brake-on time 29.0 seconds (sustained) 
Rollout distance 10,095 feet 
Rollout time 60.9 seconds 
Runway 22 (concrete) at EAFB 
Orbiter weight at landing 227,279 lb (landing estimate) 
From 
Parameter ft/sec Pitch rate, 
deg/sec 
I Main gear touchdown 217.4 -3.5 n/a Nose gez - tuuchdown 7288 160.2 n/a i 3.92 I 
Brake sensor location 
Left-hand inboard 1 
Left-hand inboard 3 
Left-hand outboard 2 
Left-hand outboard 4 
Right-hand inboard 1 
Right-hand inboard 3 
Right-hand outboard 2 
Right-hand outboard 4 
Aerodynamics, Beating, and Thermal Interfaces 
Peak 
pressure, 
psia 
936 
912 
816 
864 
1332 
1320 
1344 
1344 
Left-hand outboard 
Left-hand inboard 
Right-hand inboard 
Right-hand out~oard 
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal. DTO 251 - Part 5, (Entry 
~erodynamics Control Surfaces Test - Alternate Elevon Schedule was performed 
during entry; however, the DTO was modified to use the automatic elevon schedule 
due to thermal concerns resulting from d-e seen in the elevon cove area of 
OV-103 after STS-56. 
10.15 
13.03 
16.16 
18.67 
Evaluation of the integrated heating showed that all heating had been within 
nominal limits. The thermal int 'aces all performed satisfactorily and within 
the experience base. 
Brake assembly Energy, 
million it-1,. 
Thermal Co~~trol Subsystem 
The thermal control subsystem performed nominally with all temperatures being 
maintained within limits. 
At 117:22:33 G.m.t. (01:07:43 HET), the heater for RCS thruster L4D failed on 
(Flight Problem STS-55-V-06). The heater was controlled manually for the 
remainder of the flight. The injector upper temperature was limited to 160°F 
(operational) and 18S°F (non-operational). The injector lover temperature was 
limited to 60°F. The switch controlling the thruster L4D neater also controls 
the heaters on five other thrusters. This failure did not impact operations on 
this flight. 
Downlink video showed the tunnel adapter extravehicular activity (EVA) hatch 
thermal cover to be open approximately 80 degrees (Flight Problem STS-55-V-09). 
This same problem was noted on STS-40 (Flight Problem STS-40-V-09). Thermal 
analysis indicated that this anomaly would have no mission impact. 
The hydraulic system 3 main pump case drain temperature measurement (V58T0385A) 
exhibited an unusual signature (Flight Problem STS-55-V-07). The 
Rydraulics/Vater Spray Boiler Subsystem contains a more detailed discussion of 
this anomaly. 
The forward fuselage structural temperature violated the entry interface limit 
of 61°F, reaching 65°F just prior to entry interface. The violation was the 
result of the attitude the vehicle was in d~ring the one-orbit delay of landing 
because of weather. A data review indicates that the loads, which include 
mechanical and thermal loads, experienced during entry were lower than the 
certified loads. Therefore, this violation was of no impact to the flight or 
the vehicle. 
Aerothermodynamics 
During entry, early boundary layer transition was experienced on the lower 
surface, occurring at Hach 13 which is about 1070 seconds after entry interface. 
Normal transition occurs between Mach 9 and 6, and between 1100 and 1300 seconds 
after entry interface. Two gsp fillers, protruding about 1/4 inch beyond the 
outer mold line aft of the nose landing gear doors, are suspected of being the 
cause of the early transition. 
Local heating during entry was nominal with postflight analysis of the data 
continuing. DTO 251 was modified to avoid abnormal heating that was experienced 
in the elevon cove area on STS-56. 
Acreage heating rise was near the structural temperature Limit of experience on 
the aft fuselage, and the left and right wings. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem 
Based on structural temperature response data, the thermal protection subsystem 
performed satisfactorily and prevented heating damage effectively throughout 
ascent and entry. The overall boundary layer transition from laminar to 
turbulent flow was symetric, but occurred earlier than normal. 
The TPS sustained 143 hits of which 13 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. Of the total hits, the lower surface had 128, the upper surface 6, the 
right side 1, the left side 3, the right OMS pod 5 and the left OMS pod had 
zero. A comparjson of these numbers with statistics from previous missions 
indicates that the total number of hits and hits greater than one inch were both 
near average. No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, 
or brakes. 
The reusable carbon carbon (RCC) performance was nominal, with small pores with 
type-A coating-bubbling evident. The nose landing gear door (NLGD) thermal 
barriers were in good condition, with minor fraying noted. Both aft outboard 
corner tiles were damaged and will be scrapped. Four protruding Ames gap 
fillers were noted on the lower surface. Two were located just aft of the NLGD 
on the left side just off of the centerline. The third was on the left-hand 
side, inboard of the main landing gear door (HLGD). The fourth was located on 
the left-hand inboard elevon. The MLGD thermal barriers sustained damage at 
five locations. The ET door thermal barriers were in good condition. 
Base heat shield peppering was nominal. However, one tile that was located 
between SSUE1s 2 and 3 was damaged beyond repair. All three dome-mounted heat 
shield blankets were in good condition. Also, an unusual elliptically shaped 
area of residue was noted on SSHE 3 heat shield at the 4 o'clock position, and 
it covered an area approximately 6 inches by 9 inches. Chemical samples were 
taken and the analysis indicates that the residue was primarily ammonium 
nitrate. The source of the residue is unknown. 
Eleven pieces of tile material were found on the runway after landing, and these 
matched the damage to the three tiles on the lower right edge of the vertical 
tail stinger. This area has been damaged on previoas missions where the drag 
chute was flown. 
A infrared spot radiometer was used to measure the surface temperatures on 
several areas of the Orbiter in accordance with OHRSD requirements. Twenty 
minutes after landing, the nosecap RCC temperature was 160.1°F. Fifty-two 
minutes after landing, the right-hand wing leading edge RCC panel no.9 was 
78.2OF, and fifty-five minutes after landing, RCC panel no. 17 was 82.3OF. 
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPHENT/GOVERN?lENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT 
- 
The flight crew equipment/government furnished equipment operated satisfactorily 
throughout the missior! with the exception of the payload general support 
computer (PGSC). 
The crew reported on flight day 8 that the PGSC deorbit program would not accept 
a request for only KSC or Edwards landing sites (Plight Problem STS-55-V-16). 
The crew also observed that the state vector input screen would not accept new 
data after old data had been deleted. After exiting to the main menu and 
returning, the problems did not recur. Tne PGSC was sent to JSC for 
troubleshooting. 
CARGO INTEGRATION 
The cargo integration hardware operated without anomaly throughout the mission. 
Areas of support included the analysis and confirmation of primary Orbiter 
refrigerator/freezer (ORF) troubleshooting. A suit fan power cable was modified 
on-orbit for use during the ORF troubleshooting. The primary ORF was shut down 
for the remainder of the mission, and the backup ORF was activated and 
functioned properly. 
New hardware provided for this flight consisted on two Orbiter aft flight deck 
ORF instrumentation harnesses which performed properly. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES 
A total of 11 development test objectives and 10 detailed supplementary 
objectives were assigned to the STS-55 mission. Nine of the 11 DTOfs were 
completed as planned, one (DTO 251) was modified during the mission, and one 
(DTO 805) was not accomplished. All 10 of the DSOfs were completed 
satisfactorily. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES 
DTO 236 - Ascent Wing Aerodynamic Distributed Loads Verification - This DTO was 
satisfactorily completed, and the results of the analyses will be published in a 
separate document. STS-55 was the seventh flight of this DTO. 
DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - Alternate Elevon Schedule - 
The Hission Management Team (MHT) decided to adjust the DTO 251 elevon schedule 
to the automatic elevon schedule rather than the alternate sched~le. In 
addition, the aileron trim limit for the body flap sweep was expanded as a 
result of an increase in the end-of-mission Y-axis center of gravity. This DTO 
was manifested seven times on previous Space Shuttle flights. 
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - The data for this DTO was 
collected and it has been given to the sponsor f ~ r  evaluation. The results of 
the evaluation will be reported in a separate document. STS-55 was the 
forty-first flight of this DTO. 
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were collected for this DTO, and 
the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the 
evcluation will be reported in a separate document. STS-55 was the thirty-fourth 
flight of this DTO. 
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Methods 1 and 2) - The crew was able to expose one 
roll of 70-mm film, which contained 34 ET photographs of excellent quality, 
using the hand-held Easselblad camera and the 250-mm lens. The crew was also 
able to expose one roll of good quality 16-mm film with 950 frames (39.6 seconds 
elapsed time) of photographs for evaluation. In addition, one roll of 16-mm 
film and one roll of 35-mm film were exposed with the umbilical well cameras. 
STS-55 was the twenty-ninth flight of this DTO during the Space Shuttle Program. 
No major anomalies were observed. Four marksldivots were visible on the LH 
tank surface (+Z axis to the lei t of the forward ETlOrbiter at tachment bipo8) 
and other marks/divots were seen along the LE2 tanklintertank closeout. Two 
markddivots were also observed on the LH2 tank/ir.tertank closeout interface on 
the far side of the ET (-2 axis). 
The LH 4-inch ETlOrbiter disconnect valve closed slowly, 11 seconds after the 
cornman3 was sent. The valve normally requires one second to close. All of the 
DTO photography were viewed specifically to determine if any venting from the ET 
umbilicals could be detected. No signs of venting from the ET were observed. 
DTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System (nose in the air deployment after initiation 
of derotation with crosswind < 10 knots and touchdown near the runway 
centrrline) - This DTO was f l k  as planned and the data are being analyzed by 
the sponsor. The results of the analysis will be published in a separate 
document. STS-55 was the eighth flight of this DTO. 
DTO 623 - Cabin Air Monitoring - The data for this DTO have been given to the 
sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in a 
separate document. STS-55 was the thirteenth flight of this DTO. 
DTO 660 - Thermal Impulse Printer Jhmonstration - The TIPS performed 
satisfactorily once the Ku-band transmission anomaly was understood to be a 
configuration problem. The EBIA was required as a timing source for the TIPS; 
however, the EBIA was physically located in the TAGS unit and whenever the TAGS 
was powered down, the timing source was lost and this resulted in the loss of 
TIPS operations. Procedures were corrected to enable the ZBIA to operate when 
the TAGS was powered off, and the TIPS operated exceptionally well after this 
procedural change. STS-55 was the second flight of DTO 660. 
irrO 663 - Acoustical Noise Dosimeter Data - Data were collected for this DTO, 
and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the 
evaluation will be published in a separate document. STS-55 was the eighth 
flight of this DTO. 
DTO 665 - Accustical Noise Sound Level Data - Data were collected for this DTO, 
and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the 
evaluation will be published in a separate document. STS-55 was the third 
flight of this DTO. 
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO was not performed because 
crosswinds were not of significant magnitude during the landing of the Orbiter. 
STS-55 was the sixteenth flight of this DTO. 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
DSO 323 - Evaluation of Samples Obtained from the Urine Honitoring System 
(Configuration 1 and 3) - All samples were obtained in accordance with the 
timeline. The crew reported that some of the early samples were foamy which is 
indicative of low-voluae levels. The samples have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be published in a separate 
document . 
DSO 486 - Physical Examination in Space - This DSO was performed twice with two 
video downlinks of the activities that will also serve as partial fulfillment of 
DSO 802 - Educational Activities. Mission Specialist 2 (Dr. Harris) 
demonstrated a physical examination of Mission Specialist 1 (Major Precourt) to 
the Mayo Clinic. The video downlinks have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation, and the res~lts will be reported in a separate publication. 
DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress - This DSO was 
performed as an ED0 buildup medical evaluation. Data were collected for this 
DSO during the desired periods, and the data have been given to the sponsor for 
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in a separate 
publication. 
DSO 617 - Evaluation of Skeletal Muscle Performance Following Space Flight - 
Data for this DSO were collected during postflight medical examinations and 
tests. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and reporting of 
the results of the evaluation. 
DSO 618 - Effects of Intense Exercise During Space Flight on Aerobic Capacity 
and Orthostatic Function - Data from the Pil-ot's exercise period on the day 
prior to entry were downlinked successfully after initial difficulties caused by 
an apparent loose connection which the crew corrected. The data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor, and the results of this evaluation will be reported in 
a separate publication. 
DSO 625 - Measurement of Blood Volume Before and After ;pace Plight - Data for 
this DSO were collected during the normal preflight and postflight activities. 
The data are being evaluated by the sponsor and the results of that evaluation 
will be published separately. 
DSO 802 - (Educational Activities (Objectives 1 and 2 - with 2 being highly 
desirable) - Videos of the flight operations have been provided to develop 
educational videos (Objective 1). Objective 2, live downlink of educational 
activities, was accomplished in conjunction with DSO 486. 
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Numerous activities were video-taped or 
transmitted in real-time during the mission. Video tapes of these activities 
are being evaluated. 
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Numerous activities were 
photographed and will, as an adjunct, be evaluated in support of this DSO. 
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photograghy - Numerous still pictures were taken of 
Earth scenes as well as activities in the crew compartment, 
PROTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSES 
-d -
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
On launch day, 24 of the expected 24 video views sf the launch were screened and 
no in-flight anomalies were noted. Also during the course of the mission, 54 of 
the expected 55 launch films were also examined with no anomalies noted. 
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
No on-orbit photographic or video analysis requirements existed for this 
mission. However, a detailed discussion and analysis of DTO 312 photography is 
presented in the DTO section of this report. 
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO ANALYSIS 
On landing day, seven videos plus NASA Select were screened, and no anomalous 
events or circumstances were noted. All drag chute deployment and jettison 
activities were taped and all appeared to be nominal. 
TABLE I.- STS-55 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
(a) On-Pad Abort 
(b) Mission Timeline 
Event 
APU activation 
SRH HPU activation 
Main engine start 
Main engine stop 
APU Deactivation 
I Event 1 Description I Actual time, 
APU activation 
Description 
APU-1 GG Chamber Pressure 
APU-2 GG Chamber Pressure 
APU-3 GG Chamber Pressure 
LH HPU System A Start Command 
RH HPU System A Start Command 
SSMi-3 Start Command to EIU 
SSME-2 Start Command to EIU 
SSME-1 Start Command to EIU 
SSME-3 Shutdown 
SSME-2 Shutdcwn 
SSME-1 Shutdown 
APU-1 GG Chamber Pressure 
APU-2 GG Chamber Pres, cure 
APU-3 GG Chamber Pressure 
- 
Main propulsion 
System starta 
Actual time. 
G.m. t. 
081:14:46:10.50 
081:14:46:11.64 
081:14:46:12.74 
081:14:50:32 
081:14:50:32 
081:14:50:53.437 
081:14:50:53.557 
081:14:50:53.677 
081:14:50:54.956 
081:14:50:56.259 
081:14:50:57.526 
081:14:51:52.70 
081:14:51:53.55 
081:14:51:55.09 
SRB ignition command 
(lift-off) 
Throttle up to 
100 percent thrus ta 
Throttle down to 
72 percent thus ta 
Maximum dynamic 
pressure (c) - 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
LH HPU system A start command 
LH HPU system B start command 
RH HPU system A start command 
RH HPW system B start command 
Engine 1 start command accepted 
Engine 2 start command accepted 
Engine 3 start command accepted 
SRB ignition command to ARB 
Engine 1 corr. .dnd accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Derived ascent dynamic 
pressure 
a~~~~ supplied data 
34 
TABLE I.- STS-55 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued) 
I Event 
I - Throttle up to 104 percent thrusta 
Both SRM1s chamber 
pressure at 50 psia 
SRB separation cc~mand 
SRB phys i cala 
separation 
Throttle down fora 
3g acceleration 
3g acceleration 
Throttle down to 
67 percent thrusta 
ET separation 
OMS-1 ignition 
OMS-1 cutoff 
APU deactivation 
I~a~load bay door open 
I' MSPC supplied data. 
Description 1 Actual time, 
Engine 1 command accepted 
E~~gine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
;lid-range select 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
SRB separation command flag 
LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Total load factor 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accept 
Engine 1 command accept 
Engine 2 command accept 
Command flag 
Confirm flag 
ET separation command flag 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Right engj ne bi-prop valve 
pasi tion 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
PGD right open 1 
PLBD left open 1 
116: 14:52:05 
116:14:52:05.497 
116:14:52:05.497 
116:14:57:32.165 
116:14:57:32.195 
116:14:57:32.204 
116:14:57:37.8 
116:14:58:23.686 
116:14:58+23.716 
116:14:58:23.725 
116: 14:58: 30.287 
116:14:58:30.316 
116:14:58:30.325 
116:14:58:30 
116:1.4:58:31 
116: 14:58:49 
Not performed - 
direct insertion 
trajectory flown 
116:15:86:21.47 
116:15:06:22.39 
116:15:06:22.73 
116:15:29:53.9 
TABLE I.- STS-55 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded) 
Event 
Flight control 
system checkout 
APU starr 
APU stop 
Payload bay door 
close 
APU activation 
for entry 
Deorbit maneuver 
ignition 
Deorbit maneuver 
cutoff 
Entry interface 
(400K) 
Blackout ends 
Terminal area 
energy management 
Hain lan2lng gear 
contact 
Main landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Drag chute deplgy 
Nose ianding gear 
contact 
Nose landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Drag chute jettison 
Wheels stop 
APU deactivation 
Description 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
PLBD left close 1 
PLBD right close 1 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-? GG chamber pressure 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
posit ion 
Current orbital altitude 
above reference ellipsoid 
Data locked at high sample 
rate 
Major mode change (305) 
LH MLG tire pressure 
RH MLG tire pressure 
LB M U  weight on wheels 
RH MLG weight on wheels 
Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts 
NU; ti re pressure 
NU; VT on Wheels -1 
Drag chute jettison 1 CP Volts 
Velocity with respect to 
runway 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
Actual time, 
- G.m.t. 
125:10:20:01.71 
125:16.25:30.52 
126:09:21:31 
126:09:23:51 
126:13:24:19.58 
126:13:45:57.11 
126:13:45:58.43 
126:13:29:20.3 
126:13:29:20.1 
126:13:32:13.5 
126:13:32:13.4 
126:13:58:35 
No blackout 
126:14:23:1.3 
126:14:29:59 
126:14:29:59 
126:14:29:59 
126:14:30:00 
126:14:30:14.9 
126:14:30:17 
126:14:30:18 
126:14:30:40.6 
126:?4:31:04 
126:14:44:57.23 
126:14:44:58.91 
126:14:44:59.67 
--- 
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an
 t
ho
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
e 
pr
io
r 
t
o
 i
t 
k
i
n
g
 w
l
d
o
d
 i
nt
o 
th
o 
fi
na
l 
a
s
s
e
m
bl
y.
 
Si
nc
o 
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
ur
in
g 
o
f 
th
is
 
v
a
lv
o,
 p
ro
co
du
ro
s 
ha
ve
 b
e
?
 d
ov
ol
op
od
 t
o 
r
o
v
is
o 
th
o 
c
ho
ck
ou
t 
to
ol
 
in
st
al
la
ti
on
 s
.
qu
on
co
 
a
n
d 
to
 i
ns
po
ct
 t
ho
 O
-r
in
g 
fo
r 
da
ma
go
 a
ft
or
 u
s
e
.
 
Th
e 
O-
ri
ng
 
ha
s 
m
 a
r
o
a
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
of
 t
ho
 s
o
a
li
ng
 s
u
r
fa
cr
 w
hi
ch
 c
a
n
 k
 a
 
tr
ap
 f
qr
 c
o
n
ta
mi
na
ti
on
. 
%i
s 
a
r
o
a
 
is
 d
ow
ns
tr
oa
m 
o
f 
th
o 
po
pp
et
 
fl
ow
 
Ir
ol
os
 a
n
d 
u
ps
tr
oa
m 
o
f 
th
o 
v
a
lv
e 
fl
ow
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 a
r
e
a
.
 
T
ho
 c
o
n
ta
mi
na
ti
on
 
w
a
s
 
fo
un
d 
in
 t
hi
s 
r
e
gi
on
. 
C0.
bin
.d 
r
o
v
o
r
s
o
 
fl
ow
 c
ho
ck
 &
ta
p 
s
ho
wi
ng
 
c
o
n
s
is
te
nt
ly
 h
ig
ho
r 
r
o
a
di
ng
s 
th
an
 t
ho
 &
ta
ba
s.
, 
s
u
pp
or
t 
th
is
 
co
rr
cl
us
io
n.
 
Th
o 
c
o
r
r
o
c
ti
vo
 a
c
ti
ca
s 
r
dd
co
ss
in
g 
th
is
 i
ss
uo
 f
al
l 
in
to
 t
ho
 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
th
ro
e 
gr
ou
ps
. 
#o
ur
 T
or
m 
Pl
an
 
~
s
t
a
bl
is
h r
 
n
o
w
 
c
o
r
bi
no
d 
r
o
v
o
r
s
o
 
le
ak
 c
ho
ck
 w
it
h 
a
 
c
o
r
bi
ne
' 
a
ll
ow
ab
le
 
lo
ak
ag
o 
o
f 
t7
 s
c
im
 (
wa
s 
<
50
 s
c
im
l.
 F
ai
lu
re
 o
f 
th
is
 c
r
it
rr
la
 r
o
qu
jr
os
 
is
ol
at
io
n 
le
ak
 c
hn
ck
s 
to
 b
in
d 
th
o 
in
di
vi
du
al
 l
ea
ki
ng
 v
a
lv
e.
 
An
y 
v
a
lv
e 
w
it
h 
a
 
le
ak
 v
a
lu
e 
>
5 
a
c
im
 w
o
u
ld
 k
 r
r
pl
ac
od
. 
In
di
vi
du
al
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
o 
is
ol
at
io
n 
lo
ak
ag
t,
 s
u
m
 
u
s
t
 r
t
c
h
 c
u
r
bi
no
d 
lo
ak
ag
o 
w
it
hi
n 
3 
s
c
im
 o
r
 
a
dd
it
io
na
l 
c
yc
lo
s 
w
o
u
ld
 k
 r
o
qu
ir
od
. 
Co
mb
in
od
 l
ea
k 
c
ho
ck
s 
w
it
h 
>
I
1 
s
c
im
 a
n
d 
w
it
h 
n
o
 
is
ol
at
od
 v
a
lv
o 
fo
un
d 
>
5 
s
c
im
, 
a
n
d 
c
o
lb
in
od
 l
oa
ka
go
 
n
o
t 
w
it
hi
n 
th
o 
3 
s
c
im
 l
im
it
 s
ha
ll
 c
a
u
s
o
 
a
11
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
os
 t
o 
k
 t
op
la
co
d 
in
 t
ha
t 
s
ys
to
m.
 
Ei
gh
t 
c
o
n
s
o
c
u
ti
vo
 s
u
c
c
e
s
s
fu
l 
c
ho
ck
s 
w
il
l 
bo
 c
o
n
du
ct
od
 
o
n
 
n
o
w
 
v
a
lv
os
 o
r
 
s
ys
te
ms
 w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
es
 o
r
 
It
no
s 
r
e
pl
ac
ed
 s
in
ce
 
th
o 
la
st
 h
ot
-f
ir
e.
 
Th
os
o 
a
dd
it
io
na
l 
r
o
q
u
ir
om
ts
 i
qr
ov
od
 t
ho
 
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y 
o
f 
fi
nd
in
g 
a
 
c
o
n
ta
si
na
te
d 
c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
o.
 
T
hi
s 
is
 t
he
 
r
at
io
na
l.
 
fo
r 
fl
ig
ht
 u
n
ti
l 
a
 
n
o
w
 
s
c
r
o
o
n
in
g 
w
t
h
o
d 
is
 d
ov
el
op
d.
 
kt.
: 
9%
-5
6,
 
ST
S-
55
, 
a
n
d 
SF
S-
57
 
w
o
r
e
 
c
lo
ar
od
 f
or
 f
li
gh
t 
by
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
ng
 
-
 
fo
r 
a
t 
lo
rr
t 
e
ig
ht
 c
o
n
s
o
c
u
ti
vo
 l
ea
k 
c
ho
ck
 c
yc
le
s 
u
s
in
g 
da
ta
 
fr
om
 o
n
gi
no
 
bu
il
d 
tc
 p
ro
so
nt
. 
An
y 
v
a
lv
o(
s)
 w
ti
ic
h 
di
d 
n
o
t 
ha
ve
 a
t 
le
as
t 
e
ig
ht
 w
r
o
 
r
o
qu
ir
od
 t
o 
ha
ve
 o
n
o
u
gh
 c
yc
lo
s 
c
o
ql
ot
od
 a
t 
W
C
 to
 b
ri
ng
 t
he
m 
to
 
th
at
 
to
ta
l.
 
Th
is
 w
o
r
k 
w
a
s
 
c
o
l~
lo
to
d p
or
 R
oc
ko
td
yn
o 
Ac
ti
on
 R
w
e
s
t
s
 (
a
)
.
 
Co
no
nt
s/
St
at
us
 
Lo
ng
 T
or
m 
Pl
an
 
Ro
vo
rr
o 
fl
us
h 
th
o 
v
a
lv
o/
li
nu
 
a
s
s
o
n
bl
y 
at
 
th
o 
c
o
.
po
no
nt
 
lo
vo
l.
 
Po
rf
or
m 
th
o 
e
ig
ht
 l
ea
k 
c
ho
ck
 c
yc
le
s 
a
t 
th
o 
c
o
lp
on
on
t 
lo
vo
l 
to
 o
li
mi
na
to
 t
ho
so
 
c
ho
ck
s 
a
t 
IC
SC
. 
El
im
in
at
o 
o
r
 
m
in
im
is
o 
a
11
 p
ot
en
ti
al
 s
o
u
r
c
o
s
 
o
f 
c
o
n
ta
a-
 
in
at
io
n 
fr
om
 b
ui
ld
 a
n
d 
to
st
 o
q
u
i
p
n
t
,
 a
n
d 
m
a
ke
 p
ro
co
du
ro
s 
fo
r 
u
s
e
 
o
f 
th
is
 q
u
i
p
w
n
t
 r
e
fl
ec
t 
th
is
 i
nt
on
t.
 
Ro
vi
so
 p
ro
co
du
rs
 t
o 
in
sp
oc
t 
a
n
d 
pr
ov
id
o 
fo
r 
pr
ot
oc
ti
on
 n
f 
o
r
if
ic
o 
pl
at
. 
a
l
i
v
n
t
 p
in
s.
 
M
k
o
 l
ea
k 
c
he
ck
 a
n
d 
in
st
al
la
ti
on
 p
ro
ca
du
ro
s 
c
o
n
s
is
to
nt
 a
t 
a
11
 s
it
rs
. 
Th
os
o 
pr
o-
 
c
o
du
ro
s 
s
ho
ul
d 
bo
 s
o
n
s
it
iv
o 
to
 a
c
c
u
r
a
c
y 
o
f 
L 
s
c
im
. 
R*
qu
ir
o 
o
n
0 
c
o
w
 
bi
no
d 
le
ak
 c
ho
ck
 w
it
h 
th
o 
~
r
o
c
o
o
di
ng
 pu
rg
a 
fo
r 
e
a
c
h 
e
n
gi
ne
 f
lo
w.
 
Cl
ss
os
s 
Ro
do
si
 
ti
on
s.
 
L
o
 h
ll
ow
in
gc
~u
re
s 
r
r
o
 
pr
es
en
tl
y 
bo
in
g 
o
v
a
lu
at
od
 a
s
 
r
e
de
si
gn
 
o
pt
io
ns
. 
Do
so
ns
it
iz
o 
s
ys
to
m 
fo
r 
le
ak
ag
o 
in
 a
n
 
a
tt
em
pt
 
to
 d
el
ot
o 
th
e 
r
o
dl
in
e.
 
Ch
an
go
 t
ho
 s
y
n
t
o
~
s
o
ft
wa
ro
 to
 r
o
du
co
 s
u
s
c
e
pt
ib
il
it
y 
fo
r 
r
o
d-
 
li
ne
 s
hu
td
ow
n.
 
El
im
in
at
o 
th
e 
n
o
o
d 
fo
r 
r
li
gn
wn
t 
pi
ns
 i
n 
m
y
 s
ys
te
m 
s
u
s
c
o
pt
ib
lo
 t
o 
c
o
n
ta
mi
na
ti
on
. 
Ev
rl
ua
to
 
pr
oc
or
se
s 
a
n
d 
fi
lt
er
s 
to
 
a
s
s
u
r
o
 
a
ys
to
m 
c
lo
an
li
no
ss
. 
In
 c
o
n
c
lu
si
on
, 
th
is
 p
ro
bl
em
 w
a
s
 
c
a
u
s
e
d 
by
 c
o
n
ta
mi
na
ti
on
 t
ra
pp
od
 u
n
de
r 
th
o 
s
o
a
t 
o
f 
th
o 
OP
B 
M
I 
c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
e.
 
It
 w
a
s
 
in
tr
od
uc
ed
 i
nt
o 
th
o 
v
a
lv
e 
a
t 
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
ur
e 
a
n
d 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t 
do
to
ct
od
 u
n
ti
l 
th
o 
a
bo
rt
. 
Th
e 
a
dd
it
io
na
l 
r
o
v
o
r
s
o
 
le
ak
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
e 
c
yc
le
s 
o
n
 
th
o 
o
x
id
iz
or
 c
ho
ck
 v
a
lv
os
 s
ho
ul
d 
pr
ov
id
o 
c
o
n
fi
do
nc
o 
fo
r 
th
o 
pr
os
on
t 
th
at
 t
ho
 v
a
lv
or
 a
r
o
 
n
o
t 
c
o
n
ta
mi
- 
n
a
te
d.
 
Ot
he
r 
c
o
r
r
o
c
ti
vo
 a
c
ti
on
s 
w
il
l 
bo
 c
o
n
s
id
er
ed
 f
or
 t
ho
 l
on
g 
te
rm
, 
a
s
 -
11
 
a
s
 
o
pt
io
ns
 r
e
ga
rd
in
g 
pa
ss
ib
lo
 r
o
do
si
gn
 i
lp
ro
vo
mn
ts
. 
Al
th
ou
gh
 c
o
o
la
nt
 
li
ne
r 
pr
rs
su
ro
 
s
hi
ft
s 
o
f 
th
o 
di
sc
us
so
d 
m
a
gn
it
ud
e 
ha
vo
 
bo
on
 o
bs
or
vo
d 
o
n
 
th
e 
o
n
gi
no
 t
os
ti
ng
 a
n
d 
do
ve
lo
pu
nt
 p
ro
gr
am
, 
th
is
 
po
ru
ta
ti
on
 f
al
ls
 o
u
ts
id
e 
th
o 
r
o
tu
m-
to
-f
li
gh
t 
da
ta
ba
se
 
(3
0 
fl
ig
ht
s)
. 
Th
o 
pr
os
su
ro
 s
hi
ft
s 
a
ls
o 
v
io
la
to
d 
th
o 
RI
.0
04
61
 
(g
ro
on
 r
u
n
) 
s
pe
ci
fi
ca
ti
on
 
o
f 
30
0 
pa
id
 
(
n
x
i
w
)
,
 wh
ic
h 
is
 d
ot
or
mi
no
d 
bo
tu
oo
n 
th
o 
c
o
o
la
nt
 
li
ne
r 
pr
os
su
ro
 m
in
us
 t
ho
 H
CC
 h
ot
 g
as
 i
nj
ec
ti
on
 p
ro
sa
ur
o,
 
pl
us
 1
00
 p
si
d.
 
Co
nv
or
so
ly
, 
th
o 
40
0-
ps
id
 r
o
dl
in
o 
m
a
r
gi
n 
w
a
s
 
u
in
ta
in
od
 t
hr
ou
gh
ou
t 
th
e 
fl
ig
ht
. 
Th
is
 m
P
 
(u
ni
t 
n
o.
 
40
15
) 
ha
d 
ac
-l
at
od
 
tw
o 
s
ta
rt
s 
a
n
d 
93
5 
s
e
c
o
n
ds
 
pr
io
r 
to
 t
ho
 S
TS
-5
5 
m
is
si
on
. 
Th
o 
u
n
it
 w
a
s
 
a
c
c
o
pt
an
co
 t
es
te
d 
a
n
d 
th
en
 
fl
ow
 o
n
 
ST
S-
49
 
(
m
y
 7,
 1
99
2)
. 
Th
o 
c
o
o
la
nt
 l
in
er
 p
ro
ss
ur
o 
w
a
s
 
n
o
r
m
a
l 
a
n
d 
s
te
ad
y 
du
ri
ng
 t
ho
 t
os
t 
a
n
d 
ST
S-
49
 
fl
ig
ht
. 
Th
o 
pr
os
su
ro
 d
ur
in
g 
ST
S-
55
, 
ho
wv
or
, 
e
x
hi
bi
te
d 
po
rt
ur
ba
ti
on
s 
a
s
 h
ig
h 
a
s
 
11
0 
ps
id
. 
Th
is
 u
gn
it
ud
o 
o
f 
pr
or
su
ro
 c
ha
ng
e 
is
 a
t 
th
o 
u
pp
er
 e
n
d 
o
f 
o
x
po
ri
on
co
 w
it
h 
th
o 
e
n
la
rg
ed
 c
a
o
la
nt
 l
ih
or
 d
is
ch
ar
ge
 o
r
if
ic
os
. 
A
 
pc
os
su
r~
 ch
an
go
 o
f 
u
p 
to
 1
13
 p
si
 h
as
 b
oo
n 
o
bs
or
vo
d 
o
n
 
th
o 
o
n
gi
no
 d
ov
ol
- 
op
l.
br
t 
pr
og
ra
m.
 
H
PF
TP
 f
li
gh
t 
u
n
it
 2
02
6 
o
x
pe
ri
on
co
d 
a
 
70
-p
si
 
c
ha
ng
e 
o
n
 
th
o 
ST
S-
26
R 
m
is
si
on
. 
Th
is
 w
a
s
 
th
o 
m
x
i
w
 fl
ig
ht
 o
x
po
ci
on
co
 v
a
lu
e 
o
n
 
c
o
o
la
nt
 l
in
er
 A
P 
pr
io
r 
to
 S
TS
-5
5.
 
Th
o 
m
o
s
t 
li
ke
ly
 c
a
u
s
e
 
fo
r 
th
o 
n
o
te
d 
po
rt
ur
ba
ti
on
s 
is
 h
ot
-q
as
 l
ea
ka
go
 b
y 
th
o 
m
o
u
n
t-
ri
ng
 
s
ta
ti
c 
s
e
a
ls
. 
Th
e 
bs
cr
ip
ti
on
 
Du
ri
ng
 a
s
c
o
n
t 
o
f 
th
o 
s
TS
-5
5 
m
is
si
on
, 
th
o 
a
-
3
 
(Z
-2
02
9)
 H
P
m
 W
C
 
c
o
o
la
nt
 
li
ne
r 
pr
os
su
ro
 
o
x
hi
bi
to
d 
(a
t 
(1
04
 p
er
ce
nt
) 
o
r
r
a
ti
c 
bo
ha
vi
or
 .
 
I ~r
o
bl
om
 
SI
S-
55
-E
-1
 
(C
on
ti
nu
od
I 
El
ol
wn
t 
I I 
2.
 
ST
S-
55
-L
-2
 
PE
-3
 
;IP
W
 
Co
ol
an
t 
Li
ne
r 
Pr
es
ru
ro
 C
lu
c 
t
u
a
t
io
m 
.
 
S
p
c
o
 S
hu
tt
le
 H
ai
n 
En
gi
ne
 
TA
BL
E 
11
1.
- 
H
SF
C 
El
-S 
PR
DB
LC
M
 T
R
A
C
K
IN
 L
IS
T 
Pr
ob
le
m 
Sr
S-
55
-E
-2
 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
E
lo
mn
t 
f
l
o
m
 t
wi
ce
).
 
Th
o 
a
n
o
m
a
lo
us
 W
PF
TP
 u
n
it
 4
01
5 
ha
s 
bo
rn
 r
o
tu
rn
od
 t
o 
Ro
ck
ot
dy
no
 f
or
 d
is
- 
a
s
s
e
m
bl
y 
a
n
d 
in
vo
st
ig
~t
io
n/
.n
al
ys
is
. 
Th
o 
pr
ob
le
m 
r
e
po
rt
 h
as
 b
oo
n 
do
fo
rr
od
 f
or
 S
TS
-5
7 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
Lo
vo
l 
I1
1 
lS
SF
C 
Pm
ca
 t
ra
ck
in
g 
s
ys
te
m,
 
po
nd
in
g 
th
o 
r
o
s
u
lt
s 
o
f 
di
sa
ss
o.
bl
y.
 
Ih
o 
in
-f
li
gh
t 
a
n
o
~
l
y
 cl
os
ur
e 
s
u
bd
tt
al
 i
s 
o
x
po
ct
od
 s
go
n 
fo
r 
h
v
o
l
 I: 
PR
CB
 a
pp
ro
va
l.
 
D
e
fo
rr
d.
 
Do
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
Co
r*
nt
s/
St
at
us
 
ph
on
ow
no
n 
is
 -
11
 
u
n
do
r~
to
od
 an
d 
is
 c
o
n
s
id
or
od
 a
 k
n
i
g
n
 c
o
n
di
ti
on
. 
Th
o 
s
ta
ti
c 
s
e
a
ls
 d
ag
ra
do
 o
v
e
r
 
t
i
n
 d
uo
 t
o 
th
o 
tu
rb
o-
 
in
st
al
la
ti
on
 
do
fl
oc
ti
on
s 
a
n
d 
th
o 
o
po
ra
ti
on
al
 o
n
v
ir
on
rw
nt
. 
Th
o 
pu
rp
-.
nd
 o
u
to
r 
di
aw
to
r 
s
e
a
1 
ty
pi
ca
ll
y 
hg
ra
do
s 
pr
io
r 
to
 t
ho
 i
nn
or
 d
ia
rt
or
 s
e
a
l.
 
Th
e 
in
at
al
la
ti
on
 d
ef
lo
ct
io
ns
 o
v
o
r
lo
ad
 t
ho
 s
e
a
1 
th
en
 c
r
a
c
ks
 f
or
m 
fr
om
 t
ho
 
hy
dr
og
en
 o
n
v
ir
on
un
t 
o
.
br
it
tl
ow
nt
 
(H
EE
I.
 
Th
o 
o
po
ra
ti
on
al
 d
ef
le
ct
io
ns
 
r
o
du
co
 t
ho
 c
o
qr
os
si
on
 o
n
 
th
o 
pl
.p
-.
nd
 
in
no
r 
di
ar
to
r 
s
e
a
l.
 
Fr
et
ti
ng
 
th
en
 r
o
du
co
s 
th
o 
s
e
a
li
ng
 c
a
pa
bi
li
ty
. 
Po
rt
ur
ba
ti
on
a 
in
 t
ho
 c
o
o
la
nt
 l
in
er
 p
ro
ss
ur
o 
w
il
l 
a
ls
o 
o
c
c
u
r
 
if
 t
ho
 
in
no
r 
s
e
a
l 
&g
ra
de
s 
pr
io
r 
to
 t
ho
 o
u
to
r 
s
e
a
l.
 
Ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 h
as
 s
ho
wn
 t
ha
t 
r
o
pl
ac
om
on
t 
o
f 
th
e 
s
ta
ti
c 
s
e
a
ls
 r
o
s
to
rr
s 
th
o 
pr
os
su
ro
 t
o 
n
o
r
m
a
l 
lo
vo
la
 
a
n
d 
kh
av
io
r.
 
I 
Th
oc
o 
ha
s 
k
e
n
 o
x
to
ns
iv
o 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
fu
l 
tu
rb
o-
 
o
pe
ra
ti
on
 w
it
h 
th
o 
o
n
la
rg
od
 o
r
if
ic
e 
c
o
n
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
. 
Th
or
e 
ha
ve
 k
e
n
 1
10
 b
ui
ld
s 
te
st
ed
 f
or
 
62
6 
s
ta
rt
s 
a
d
 25
2.
17
2 
s
e
c
o
n
ds
. 
Th
o 
m
x
i
a
m
 p
ro
ss
ur
o 
c
h
m
g
o
 o
bs
or
vo
d 
w
a
s
 
11
3 
ps
i 
w
it
h 
a
 
12
2 
ps
i 
m
a
r
gi
n 
to
 t
ho
 r
o
dl
in
o.
 
Th
o 
th
ro
e 
En
dr
av
ou
r 
(S
TS
-5
7)
 H
PP
FP
 u
n
it
s 
ha
vo
 o
x
hi
bi
to
d 
n
o
r
m
a
l 
a
n
d 
s
te
ad
y 
c
o
o
la
nt
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DOCUMENT SOURCES 
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data 
for this STS-54 Mission Report, the following list is provided. 
Flight Requirements Document 
Public Affairs Press Kit 
Customer Support Room Daily Reports 
HER Daily Reports 
HER Mission Summary Report 
HER Quick Look Report 
HER Problem Tracking List 
HER Event Times 
Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs 
HOD Systems Anomaly List 
MSFC Flash Report 
MSFC Event Tihes 
MSFC Interim Report 
Crew Debriefing comments 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions 
as these items are used in this document. 
ABS 
AIU 
AOET 
APU 
AR 
ARS 
ATCS 
ATU 
BITE 
CCTV 
CRT 
CRU 
CWC 
DEU 
DFRF 
DSO 
DTO 
AV 
EAFB 
EBIA 
ECLSS 
E W  
ELL1 
EPDC 
ESA 
ET 
EVA 
FCS 
FDA 
FES 
PHCA 
GAS 
GAUSS 
GFE 
GFQ 
GGVM 
GE2 G.m. t. 
GPC 
HL 
HOLOP 
HPFTP 
HPOTP 
HPT 
HPU 
IAPU 
IFH 
IMU 
ammonia boi!.er system 
audio interface unit 
Atomic Oxygen Exposure Tray 
auxiliary power unit 
Anthrorack 
atmospheric revitalization system 
Active thermal control system 
audio terminal unit 
built in test nquipment 
closed circ1.i t television 
cathode ray tube 
crew remote dnit 
contingency water carrier 
display electronics unit 
Dryden Flight Research Facility 
Detailed Supplementary Objective 
Development Test Objective 
differential velocity 
Edwards Air Force Base 
encrypt ion bypass isolation assembly 
Environmental Control and Life Support System 
Extended Duration Orbiter 
ellipsoid heating facility 
electrical power distribution and control subsystem 
European Space Agency 
External Tank 
extravehicular activity 
flight contrcl system 
fauit detection and annunciation subsystem 
flash evaporator system 
forward motor control assembly 
getaway speciai 
Galactic Ultrawide-Angle Schmidt System Camera 
Government Furnished Equipment 
gradient furnace with quenching 
gas generator valve module 
gaseous hydrogen 
Greenwich mean time 
general purpose computer 
hardline 
Holographic Optics Laboratory 
high pressure fuel turbopump 
high pressure oxidizer turbopump 
high precision thermostat 
hydraulic power unit 
improved auxiliary power unit 
in-flight maintenance 
inertial measurement unit 
B-1 
I/3 
I ~ P  
J SC 
keas 
KSC 
kwh 
LCC 
LESC 
LH2 3 
W S  
MAUS 
MECO 
MEDEA 
MET 
Mir 
Mu; 
HLGD 
MW 
MMU 
nons 
MPS 
HSFC 
NASA 
NLG 
NLGD 
NPSP 
NSTS 
01 
OHDP 
OrnSD 
OMS 
OPB 
OPS 
OP STAT 
ORF 
PAL 
PDU 
PGSC 
PLBD 
PHBT 
PP"' 
PRSD 
PTI 
RCC 
RCRS 
RCS 
REM 
RF 
RKGM 
ROTEX 
RPC 
input/output 
specific impulse 
Johnson Space Center 
knots estimated air speed 
Kennedy Space Center 
kilowatt hours 
Launch Commit Criteria 
1.ockhee.d Engineering and Sciences Company 
liquid hydrogen 
liquid oxygen 
lef t/right 
modular auxiliary data system 
Material Science Autonomous Payload 
main engine cutoff 
Material Sciences Experiment Double Rack for Experiment Modules and 
Apparatus 
mission elapsed time 
Russian Space Station 
main landing gear 
main landing gear door 
Hission Management Team 
mass memory unit 
Modular Opto-Electronic Multispectral Stereo Scanner 
main propulsion system 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
nose landing gear 
nose landing gear door 
net positive suction pressure 
National Space Transportation System 
operational instrumentation 
Orbiter Maintenance Down Period 
operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document 
orbital maneuvering subsystem 
oxidizer preburner 
operations sequence 
operational status 
Orbiter refrigerator/freezer 
protuberance air laad 
power drive unit 
payload general support computer 
payload bay door 
propellant mean bulk temperature 
parts per million 
power reactant storage and distri~ution 
programmed test input 
reinforced carbon carbon 
regenerable carbon dioxide removal system 
reaction control subsystem 
release-engage mechanism 
radio frequency 
reaction kinetic in glass melts 
Robotics Experiment 
remote power controller 
1-2 
RSRH 
SCA 
SAFEX 
SAREX- 
SPC 
SRB 
SRM 
SRSS 
S SME 
TAGS 
TDRS 
TIPS 
UHF 
USAF 
USS 
WCCS 
WCS 
WL 
WSB 
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor 
safe and arm 
Spacelab Amateur Funk Experiment 
-11 Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-I1 
stored program command 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Solid Rocket Motor 
Shuttle Range Safety Sys tem 
Space Shuttle main engine 
text and graphics system 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
thermal impulse printer system 
ultrahigh f requenc; 
U. S. Air Force 
unique support structure 
wireless crew communications system 
Waste Collec+ion System 
Werkstofflabor 
water spray boiler 
